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Making Politics De Minimis in the Political Process: 
The Unworkable Implications of Cox v. Larios in State 
Legislative Redistricting and Reapportionment 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the completion of the United States decennial census 
in the year 2000, state legislatures and federal courts returned to the 
frenzied and familiar world of congressional and state legislative 
redistricting and reapportionment.1 In the course of redrawing 
electoral district boundaries and rebalancing district populations, the 
actions of state legislatures are often and inevitably called into 
question before the federal bench. But who should decide the size 
and shape of the fundamental divisions of our electoral system?2
States, and more particularly state legislatures, are 
constitutionally endowed with the power and prerogative to draw 
the physical boundaries of legislative and congressional districts.3 The 
courts, however, play a vital role in ensuring that redistricting and 
reapportionment plans do not violate constitutional guarantees of 
equal protection by preventing “invidious discrimination”4 and by 
upholding the “one person, one vote” principle.5 In the context of 
congressional districting, the Supreme Court has given states a strict 
requirement that distinct districts within a state be of nearly equal 
population.6 In other words, any deviation from an equal population 
distribution must be justified by a legitimate state interest.7 In 
 1. By statute, and often pursuant to state constitutional provisions, states undergo the 
process of redistricting and reapportionment for congressional and state legislative elections 
following each decennial federal census. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2004) (providing for the 
apportionment of U.S. Representatives after the census); see also, e.g., GA. CONST. art. III, § 2, 
¶ 2 (2004) (providing for apportionment of the General Assembly after the decennial U.S. 
census); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-1 to -2 (2004) (providing for the apportionment and 
specifying the qualifications of members of the General Assembly). 
 2. Thomas J. Kalitowski & Elizabeth M. Brama, Should Judges Get Out of 
Redistricting?, 61 BENCH & B. MINN. 19 (2004). 
 3. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975). 
 4. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973). 
 5. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559 (1964). 
 6. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
 7. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740−41 (1983). 
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contrast, judicial review of state legislative districting plans represents 
a significant intrusion into an inherently local process and the courts 
have been appropriately deferential to state legislatures, so long as 
the resulting population deviations are de minimis.8 Consequently, 
courts have not traditionally required states to justify total 
population deviations that are below 10%, so long as there is no 
evidence of invidious discrimination.9 Deviations above 10%, 
however, are prima facie evidence of invidious discrimination and 
trigger, by implication, a type of strict scrutiny review that requires 
states to justify such deviations by showing that they are the result of 
some traditional state interest.10
The 10% threshold has proven to be a workable standard,11 as 
evidenced by the great reliance of most states; the majority have 
drawn state legislative districts with deviations falling between 9 and 
10% in at least one, and usually both, houses of their state 
legislatures.12 Yet, in Cox v. Larios, the Supreme Court summarily 
affirmed the decision of a three-judge district court that upset 
precedent by invalidating a Georgia state legislative redistricting 
statute with a total population deviation within the 10% limit.13 The 
 8. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (“Federal-court review of 
districting legislation represents a serious intrusion on the most vital of local functions. It is 
well settled that ‘reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
 9. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 745 (“[M]inor deviations from mathematical equality among 
state legislative districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious 
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the State.”). 
 10. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983) (upholding an 89% deviation because 
of state historical and constitutional interests). 
 11. The 10% rule has, by implication, long been recognized by the Supreme Court and 
has formed the basis of the majority of state redistricting schemes over the past decades. See 
Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants at *3 n.1, Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004) (No. 
03-1413), available at 2004 WL 882937. 
 12. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING 2000 
POPULATION DEVIATION TABLE (2004), at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/ 
redistrict/redistpopdev.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2004). Of forty-seven states surveyed after the 
2000 U.S. Census, twenty-nine had district deviations in excess of 9%. Id. 
 13. 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring), summarily aff’g Larios v. Cox, 
300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (three-judge court). Most of Georgia’s state legislative 
districts deviated from the ideal district by less than plus or minus 5%, with an average 
deviation in the House and Senate plans of 3.47% and 3.78%, respectively. The total deviation 
(the difference between the largest positive and negative deviations from ideal) was 9.98%. See 
Larios, F. Supp. 2d at 1326, 1327. See also Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (In All the 
Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 642 n.134 
(2004) (referencing Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2806, and stating, “Many people had read the Supreme 
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Court, in the absence of any colorable claim of racial discrimination, 
vote dilution, or unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, 
essentially applied strict scrutiny by requiring the Georgia General 
Assembly to justify its plan despite the absence of discrimination 
against a suspect classification.14 The Court justified the outcome 
because it found evidence that state legislators were partially 
motivated by political interests in enacting the redistricting 
proposal.15
Cox represents a significant departure from precedent and creates 
an unworkable standard for state legislatures to meet when drawing 
state legislative districts by effectively eliminating the traditional 10% 
safe harbor and by proscribing partisan influence. The Cox court 
ignores the reality and the political nature of state legislatures16 and 
removes the flexibility that state legislatures need to reach political 
compromises in what is arguably their most heated and politically 
contentious function.17 As a consequence, legislatures may become 
unable to enact politically viable districting plans, leaving this task to 
the courts.18 Even when compromise is achieved, and states adopt a 
redistricting plan, anytime they fail to achieve a zero population 
deviation there will be allegations of undue political influence and an 
inevitable onslaught of politically motivated lawsuits.19 The ensuing 
Court's earlier cases as creating a 10% safe harbor for state and local districting . . . and the 
Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Larios seems to reverse that thinking.”). 
 14. See id. at 2807–08 (indicating that the state failed to justify the conceded deviations 
from the principle of “one person, one vote”); see also Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1322, 1339, 
1341–42, 1349 (indicating that the state failed to justify deviations). 
 15. Id. at 2807.  
 16. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “politics as usual” may be a traditional 
criteria in redistricting). 
 17. See ROBERT MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL 
REPRESENTATION 52 (1965) (“[T]o the affected legislators [reapportionment] involves no less 
an issue than political survival.”). See generally Christopher C. Confer, To Be About the People’s 
Business: An Examination of the Utility of Nonpolitical/Bipartisan Legislative Redistricting 
Commissions, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115 (2004) (describing the heated political nature of 
redistricting and arguing for bipartisan, extralegislative bodies to carry out redistricting). 
 18. In many instances in which the courts take over the redistricting process, it is not 
because the legislatures failed to pass redistricting legislation that meets constitutional 
requirements, but rather because legislatures failed to pass any redistricting legislation at all. See 
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734 (1983) (citing Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. 
Colo. 1982)). 
 19. See Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2810 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (raising the fear of 
“encourag[ing] politically motivated litigation”). The rationale of the Cox concurrence has 
already been cited in a comparable case arising out of a Texas redistricting statute. See Reply 
Brief for Appellants in Opposition to Motion To Affirm, Travis County v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 
8DAL-FIN 12/16/2004 1:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
2002 
 
judicial dominion might not only infringe on state legislative 
discretion but would likely cost states millions of dollars in increased 
litigation expenses.20
This Note argues that states are not required to justify total 
population deviations of less than 10% among state legislative 
districts so long as the state districting plan in question does not 
discriminate on the basis of race or some other constitutionally 
protected class. Part II of this Note provides an overview of 
redistricting and reapportionment jurisprudence, briefly discussing 
the history of traditional redistricting criteria and the relevant case 
law leading up to the holding in Cox. Part III then briefly outlines 
the factual and procedural background of the issues raised in Cox, as 
well as the Court’s flawed holding that a state must justify a 
deviation of less than 10% and that political motivations in drawing 
legislative districts are improper. Part IV critically analyzes the 
reasoning employed by the concurring opinion and the three-judge 
district court panel, arguing that the Court attempted to vindicate 
the failed partisan gerrymandering claim by painting it as a “one 
person, one vote” claim, upsetting precedent and essentially 
eliminating the 10% safe harbor upon which states have come to rely 
in drawing legislative districts. In eliminating this safe harbor, the 
Court intrudes into traditional state legislative functions and invites 
an onslaught of politically motivated lawsuits that could make state 
legislatures impotent to carry out the redistricting process. Part V 
concludes that the case should have been summarily reversed or set 
for full briefing and argument so that the Court could have more 
adeptly addressed the implications of its holding. 
II. BACKGROUND: REDISTRICTING AND REAPPORTIONMENT 
First, redistricting and reapportionment are essentially different 
sides of the same coin. They are closely related, but they are not 
352 (2004) (No. 03-1400), available at 2004 WL 1900503 (citing Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2806). 
Likewise in New York, Cox has been cited as standing for the proposition that the 10% rule has 
been abandoned and states are now required to justify even the smallest population deviations 
in state legislative redistricting, as in congressional redistricting. See Brief for Kisha Thomas et 
al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants, Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346 
(S.D.N.Y 2004) (No. 04-218), available at 2004 WL 2356484 (citing Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 
2806). 
 20. See Rhonda Cook, Election 2004: Redistricting’s Cost Will Hit $2.3 Million, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 3, 2004, at 3B. 
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synonymous terms, and they are motivated by different interests. 
Second, actions alleging that a state redistricting or reapportionment 
statute violates constitutional or statutory protections are based on 
varied legal theories that invoke different standards and that require 
unique analysis. For example, a claim of racial discrimination is 
treated somewhat differently than claims alleging partisan 
gerrymandering21 or claims alleging vote dilution under the “one 
person, one vote” principle. Third, states must meet distinct 
constitutional requirements, depending on whether state legislative 
or congressional districting is at issue. 
A. Redistricting Versus Reapportionment 
One of the issues in the principal case is whether political factors 
and partisan influence are valid considerations in the redistricting 
process. To properly answer this question, it is critical to understand 
that while many cases, including Cox, use the terms “redistricting” 
and “reapportionment” interchangeably, there is a distinction.22 Pure 
reapportionment is simply “the allocation of seats in a legislative 
body where the district boundaries do not change but the number of 
members per district does,” as in the allocation of congressional seats 
among states.23 Pure redistricting is merely “the drawing of new 
 21. “[G]errymandering” refers to “the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district 
boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political purposes.” Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 
394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring). It is also used to refer to the practice of 
dominant political parties drawing electoral districts in such a way as to give it “advantage at 
the polls.” Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
The term descends from Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry, signer of the 
Declaration of Independence, delegate to the 1787 Constitutional Convention, and vice 
president to James Madison. He ran for gubernatorial reelection in 1812 after members of his 
political party, the Anti-Federalists, enacted a redistricting measure to ensure their domination 
at the next election. One of the resulting districts resembled a salamander, leading Federalist 
critics to coin the word “gerrymander” by combining the Governor’s name, Gerry, with the 
ending of salamander. Gerry was not reelected governor but was elected as James Madison’s 
vice president. See U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., AMERICA’S FOUNDING 
FATHERS: DELEGATES TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2004), at 
http://www.archives.gov/national_archives_experience/charters/constitution_founding_ 
fathers_massachusetts.html#Gerry (last visited Nov. 17, 2004); see also Gerrymandering, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 696 (7th ed. 1999). 
 22. See Abate v. Mundt, 300 N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (stating that 
“redistricting” and “reapportionment” are not synonymous). 
 23. Jensen v. Wis. Elections Bd., 2002 WI 13, ¶ 5, 639 N.W.2d 537, 539 n.2; see also 
Robert Redwine, Constitutional Law: Racial and Political Gerrymandering–Different Problems 
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political boundaries.”24 Both districting and apportionment are 
“primarily the duty and responsibility of the State,”25 and, as a 
practical matter, most state procedures reveal that districting and 
apportionment are carried out concurrently and are, in fact, 
intertwined.26 However, each is motivated by unique purposes and 
subject to unique limitations.27
1. Redistricting, partisan motivation, and traditional districting criteria 
When state legislatures draw the physical boundaries of legislative 
districts, the decision is both inherently local and inherently 
political.28 As state legislators weigh the relevant factors in 
Require Different Solutions, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 373, 374 (1998) (“[F]rom a technical 
standpoint, the words apportionment and reapportionment apply to the allocation of a finite 
number of representatives among a fixed number of pre-established areas, while districting and 
redistricting refer to the actual drawing of district lines.”). 
 24. Jensen, 639 N.W.2d at 539 n.2; see also Seaman v. Fedourich, 209 N.E.2d 778, 779 
n.1 (N.Y. 1965) (“Apportionment is the process by which legislative seats are distributed 
among units entitled to representation; districting is the establishment of the precise 
geographical boundaries of each such unit or constituency.”). It is worthy to note that some 
publications and judicial decisions refer specifically to the reallocation of the U.S. House of 
Representatives following the decennial census as “reapportionment,” while reserving the term 
“redistricting” to describe the division of state and local political subdivisions into voting 
districts. See BRUCE M. CLARKE & ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
REDISTRICTING LITIGATION: AN OVERVIEW OF LEGAL, STATISTICAL, AND CASE-
MANAGEMENT ISSUES 1 n.1 (2002) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 2a (2004)). 
 25. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975). 
 26. As states review demographic data from the U.S. census, the population numbers 
serve as a basis for drawing new districts. See, e.g., 2001–02 Guidelines for the House/Senate 
Committee on Congressional and Legislative Reapportionment and Redistricting, at 
http://georgiareapportionment.uga.edu/fguide.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2004). 
 27. See infra Parts II.A.1–2. 
 28. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (finding that districting represents 
“the most vital of local functions”); cf. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911) (holding that 
“[t]he power to locate its own seat of government and to determine when and how it shall be 
changed from one place to another, and to appropriate its own public funds for that purpose, 
are essentially and peculiarly state powers”). But see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 
(1960) (holding that a state did not have unlimited powers to modify the boundaries of a 
municipality when the purpose was to disenfranchise minority residents). As one judge wrote: 
  Establishing the boundaries of a state’s congressional and legislative districts is 
an inherently political undertaking. The territory of a district may change drastically, 
stripping the incumbent of a constituent base he or she labored to build. Some 
incumbents find themselves pitted against one another in the same district. Other 
districts are left without an incumbent, opening the door to new candidates. While 
the redistricting process may focus on demographics, land use, and population 
changes, at its heart is the competition for partisan political advantage. 
Kalitowski & Brama, supra note 2, at 19.  
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determining the exact boundaries of such political subdivisions, they 
inevitably weigh many factors, including partisan interests inherent in 
the legislative process.29 In the context of redistricting, states are 
generally only required to justify the rationale for particular 
boundaries where there is evidence of unconstitutional racial or 
partisan gerrymandering, or other invidious discrimination.30 When 
such allegations are made and plaintiffs meet their evidentiary 
burdens, courts then look to what they call “traditional redistricting 
criteria” to determine whether the state has an independent basis—
some traditional state interest—to justify the boundaries.31 Such 
criteria include making local districts compact and contiguous, 
respecting local municipal boundaries, preserving existing boundary 
lines (i.e., cores of prior districts), avoiding contests between 
incumbents, and promoting communities of interest.32 However, 
while these criteria may help a state rebut an allegation of 
unconstitutional racial or partisan gerrymandering, they are not 
constitutionally required.33
2. Reapportionment and constitutional protection 
Unlike redistricting, which often involves a balancing of 
numerous factors, apportionment promises a more ministerial-like 
act, driven by constitutional guarantees and protections.34 The Equal 
 29. See discussion infra Part IV.D. 
 30. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993) (finding, in a racial gerrymandering 
case, that plaintiffs must prove that race predominates in the drawing of district lines for 
redistricting legislation to be subject to strict scrutiny); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 
(1986) (finding, in a partisan gerrymandering case, that plaintiffs must prove both intentional 
discrimination against a political group and an actual discriminatory effect resulting from the 
drawing of district lines to challenge redistricting legislation).  
 31. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1792 (2004) (noting traditional districting 
criteria such as geographic features or communities of interest); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 
725, 740 (1983) (discussing compactness, municipal boundaries, preserving core districts, and 
avoiding contests between incumbents as state policies relevant to districting). 
 32. See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740. 
 33. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 n.18 (1973). 
 34. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (“[T]he overriding objective 
[in state legislative districting] must be substantial equality of population among the various 
districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other 
citizen in the State.”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7−8 (1964) (holding that Article I, 
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution “means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a 
congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s”). State constitutions and statutes 
also provide for regular apportionment of state legislative districts. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. 
III, § 2, ¶ 2 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-1 to -2 (2004). 
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Protection principle of “one person, one vote” generally demands 
that district populations be equal, or very nearly so, to ensure that 
every man’s vote counts as much as any other’s.35 In this context, an 
“ideal district” is found by dividing the total state population by the 
total number of districts.36 The goal of a neutral apportionment plan 
is to create districts that exactly match the “ideal,” resulting in a zero 
total deviation.37 Thus, a pure apportionment decision could almost 
be automatic, based entirely on blind statistical analysis and 
mathematical algorithms applied to census maps.38 However, despite 
the views of those who might like to see reapportionment become 
automated,39 legislative reapportionment and redistricting are so 
interconnected and intimately tied to the political process that 
automation has proven unsatisfactory.40
B. Legal Theories and Traditional Districting Criteria 
While litigation involving both redistricting and reapportionment 
is similar and often overlapping, the legal theories which form the 
basis of the claims are distinct.41 A primary distinction rests on 
 35. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 8. 
 36. See generally J. GERALD HEBERT ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N, REALISTS’ GUIDE TO 
REDISTRICTING: AVOIDING THE LEGAL PITFALLS 6 (2000). 
 37. See id. 
 38. See generally Micah Altman, The Computational Complexity of Automated 
Redistricting: Is Automation the Answer?, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 81 (1997). 
 39. On the subject of reapportionment, Ronald Reagan once said, “There is only one 
way to do reapportionment—feed into the computer all the factors except political 
registration.” Id. at 81 (citing Tom Goff, Reinecke Denounces Court: Legislative Leaders Praise 
Action, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1972, at A24 (quoting Ronald Reagan)).
 40. Some states have endeavored to remove the redistricting and reapportionment 
functions from the heated context of state legislatures, delegating the power to bipartisan 
commissions. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 72-1501 (Michie 2004) (creating the Idaho 
Commission for Reapportionment). However, these commissions have continued to encounter 
significant political and constitutional obstacles. See, e.g., Bingham County v. Idaho Comm’n 
for Reapportionment, 55 P.3d 863 (Idaho 2002) (finding that a state legislative redistricting 
plan drawn by a bipartisan commission which resulted in population deviations above the 10% 
threshold set by the U.S. Supreme Court violated the “one person, one vote” principle); see 
also Ken Miller, Redistricting Encounters More Hurdles; Commission, One Person Short, May 
Face Delay, IDAHO STATESMAN, Dec. 5, 2001, Local Section, at 1 (reporting that after the 
Commission for Reapportionment met for three months, it was still unable to draw districts 
with population deviations below the 10% federal requirement). 
 41. Essentially, there are five different legal theories upon which potential claims can be 
brought: (1) claims of population inequality (either under Article I, Section 2 for congressional 
districts, or under the “one person, one vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment for either state or congressional districts); (2) racial gerrymandering; 
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whether the issue is one of population equality among districts 
(apportionment cases involving, for example, the “one person, one 
vote” principle) or whether the district boundaries themselves are 
problematic (districting cases involving gerrymandering claims). In 
this context, much also depends on the nature of the district in 
question: state legislative districts tolerate greater population 
deviations than congressional districts. A second distinction focuses 
on who is impacted by the districts and what is the discriminatory 
effect—that is, does the district, by design or in effect, result in 
discrimination based on race or some other protected class? In Cox v. 
Larios, while the plaintiff raised numerous complaints at trial, the 
only claim at issue on appeal was an alleged violation of the “one 
person, one vote” principle among state legislative districts.42  
1. “One person, one vote” claims 
The essence of a “one person, one vote” claim is that the 
population of a suspect district is so vastly overpopulated, or that 
other districts are so vastly underpopulated, that the disparity among 
districts effectively dilutes the voting power of those in the 
overpopulated districts.43 Equal Protection, “one person, one vote,” 
claims are similar to claims brought under Article I, Section 2 
(proportional congressional apportionment) in that both are tied to 
population distributions and each requires an unconstitutional 
population deviation in order to state a claim.44 But while “one 
person, one vote” can apply to both state and congressional districts, 
Article I claims only apply to the latter. Consequently, the threshold 
(3) partisan gerrymandering; (4) violations of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) (racial 
vote dilution); and (5) issues relating to section 5 of the VRA. See generally HEBERT ET AL., 
supra note 36. 
 42. See Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806, 2808 (2004); Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 
1320, 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2004). Other potential claims include racial vote dilution (section 2 of 
the VRA), where either district boundaries or unequal population distributions may be illegal 
so far as they result in a “denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States 
to vote on account of race or color” or membership in a language minority group. 42 U.S.C. § 
1973(a) (2000) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2)). Likewise, claims under section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act alleging racial discrimination may also invalidate a redistricting plan. 
However, none of these are relevant to the scope of this Note. 
 43. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562–64 (1964). 
 44. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 323−25 (1973) (discussing population 
deviations required to implicate a violation of equal protection in state legislative districting); 
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530−31 (1969) (requiring precise population equality for 
congressional districting).  
8DAL-FIN 12/16/2004 1:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
2008 
 
population deviation required to establish a constitutional violation 
differs according to the type of district at issue. Specifically, states 
have traditionally been allowed a greater degree of population 
disparity when apportioning state legislative districts than when 
apportioning federal congressional districts.45
 
a. The high standard of congressional districting. While the 
congressional districts at issue in Cox v. Larios were ultimately found 
not to violate Article I, the “one person, one vote” principle, or the 
Voting Rights Act,46 a brief explanation of the high standard applied 
in the congressional districting context is critical because the Court, 
in effect, erroneously applied the congressional districting standard to 
invalidate state legislative districts. 
When drawing and apportioning districts for representatives to 
the United States Congress, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Constitution to require states to achieve near absolute population 
equality.47 Because of this high standard, any deviation invokes a type 
of strict scrutiny analysis, requiring states to demonstrate a legitimate 
state interest or policy that justifies even the slightest divergence.48
On this premise, in Karcher v. Daggett,49 the Court rejected a 
0.7% deviation among congressional districts.50 First, the Court 
stated that the parties challenging the apportionment statute carry 
the burden of proving that “population differences among 
districts could have been reduced or eliminated altogether by a 
good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population.”51 If that 
 45. See, e.g., Mahan, 410 U.S. at 323−25; see also infra Part IV.B.2. 
 46. See Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1353−54. 
 47. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7−8 (1964) (“[A]s nearly as is practicable one 
man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.” (emphasis added)). 
Consequently, states must meet a strict standard in achieving near precise mathematical 
equality among the populations of congressional districts. See Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 
530−31. Thus, while it may not be possible to achieve perfect mathematical precision among 
congressional districts, there is no population variance small enough to be considered de minimis 
such that the “as nearly as practicable” standard could be satisfied without question. Id. This high 
standard has its origins in the text of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 48. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 731 (1983) (“Article I, § 2 . . . ‘permits only 
the limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve 
absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.’” (quoting Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 
531)). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 730. 
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burden is not met, then the apportionment plan is upheld.52 Second, 
the Court determined that if the plaintiff “can establish that the 
population differences were not the result of a good-faith effort to 
achieve equality,” the State must justify “each significant variance” 
by showing a legitimate state interest.53 In the congressional context 
for claims of a violation of the “one person, one vote” principle, the 
threshold question is whether there is, in fact, any deviation in 
district populations.54
 
b. Deference to states in state legislative districting. Unlike the 
high standard imposed on congressional redistricting, which has a 
textual basis in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution,55 in the state 
legislative districting context, the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
interpreted only to prohibit substantial population deviations among 
districts.56 That is, de minimis population deviations are permitted 
absent invidious discrimination, primarily because of the deference 
afforded state legislatures to carry out what is inherently a state 
legislative function.57 Therefore, in contrast to congressional 
districting cases, prior to Cox, the threshold question in state 
 52. Id. at 730−31. 
 53. Id. at 731. 
 54. Id. at 732. The Court went on to explain the rationale for the heightened standard 
as applied to apportionment of congressional districts: 
To accept the legitimacy of unjustified, though small population deviations in this 
case would mean to reject the basic premise of Kirkpatrick and Wesberry. We decline 
appellants’ invitation to go that far. The unusual rigor of their standard has been 
noted several times. Because of that rigor, we have required that absolute population 
equality be the paramount objective of apportionment only in the case 
of congressional districts, for which the command of Art. I, § 2, as regards the 
National Legislature outweighs the local interests that a State may deem relevant in 
apportioning districts for representatives to state and local legislatures, but we have 
not questioned the population equality standard for congressional districts. 
Id. at 732−33; see also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 793 (1973); White v. Regester, 412 
U.S. 755, 763 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321−23 (1973). 
 55. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that Article I, Section 2 
of the U.S. Constitution “means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a 
congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s”). 
 56. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (“[T]he overriding objective [in 
state legislative districting] must be substantial equality of population among the various 
districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other 
citizen in the State.”). 
 57. See White, 412 U.S. at 764; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973). 
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legislative districting has not been whether there is any deviation, but 
rather whether the deviation is greater than 10%.58
The 10% rule has arisen by implication through a series of 
Supreme Court cases beginning with Reynolds v. Sims.59 and is 
applied in numerous district courts.60 The rule ostensibly promotes 
sovereign discretion by giving states flexibility in crafting their 
legislative districts.61 While states are expected to make a good faith 
effort to achieve population equality among districts,62 minor 
population deviations are not considered to “substantially dilute the 
weight of individual votes . . . so as to deprive individuals . . . of fair 
and effective representation.”63
 58. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 
407, 418 (1977). Compare White, 412 U.S. at 763−64 (finding that where total deviation was 
9.9%, the state did not need to provide an explanation and the deviation was not 
unconstitutional), and Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 745 (upholding a deviation of 7.83% without 
justification by the state), with Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 184−87 (1971) (holding that 
an 11.9% total deviation required a county to provide an explanation). See generally Rosanna 
M. Taormina, Comment, Defying One-Person, One-Vote: Prisoners and the “Usual Residence” 
Principle, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 440−41 (2003) (“Perhaps because ‘[t]he equal population 
requirements do not rest on the same stone in the constitutional foundation of the Republic,’ 
the Court has developed two different legal standards for evaluating federal congressional and 
state legislative redistricting plans—strict equality and the ten percent rule, respectively.”). 
 59. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 160 (1993); Brown, 462 U.S. at 842; 
White, 412 U.S. at 764; Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 745; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577; see also Taren 
Stinebrickner-Kauffman, Counting Matters: Prison Inmates, Population Bases, and “one person, 
one vote,” 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 229, 235 (2004) (“The generally accepted rule of 
thumb for state legislative districting is that if a plan has a maximum deviation of less than 10%, 
then it is prima facie constitutional; if the maximum deviation is greater than 10%, there is a 
prima facie violation.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Frank v. Forest County, 336 F.3d 570, 573 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
124 S. Ct. 1048 (2004) (observing that Brown makes it clear that the 10% rule creates a safe 
harbor); Wright v. City of Albany, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231 n.5 (M.D. Ga. 2003) (“The 
Supreme Court has created a ‘safe harbor’ in regards to deviations. While the deviation is an 
important factor for the Court to consider, anything less than 10% is within the ‘safe harbor.’” 
(citing Voinovich, 507 U.S. at 161)); Colleton County Council v. McConnell, 201 F. Supp. 2d 
618, 631 (D.S.C. 2002) (“Generally, a ‘safe harbor’ exists for legislatively implemented plans 
achieving less than a 10% deviation.”).
 61. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 
900, 915 (1995); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 749; 
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973) (“[B]roader latitude has been afforded the 
States . . . in state legislative redistricting.”); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578 (noting that state 
legislative districting is different in kind from congressional districting; thus, a more flexible 
standard for state district population deviations is constitutionally acceptable). 
 62. See Brown, 462 U.S. at 842 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577). 
 63. See White, 412 U.S. at 764. Nevertheless, at least one scholar warns that if a 
legislature intends to achieve a deviation of 10%, that may be sufficient evidence of invidious 
discrimination: 
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State legislative districts with deviations above 10% constitute a 
prima facie equal protection violation,64 effectively triggering a strict 
scrutiny review of the state plan. States must meet the “one person, 
one vote” requirement stemming from the Equal Protection 
Clause,65 but courts have permitted states to adopt plans with 
significant deviations, so long as these deviations are “justifiable and 
legally sustainable.”66 In other words, if states can provide a 
sufficient, nondiscriminatory justification based on some important 
state interest, even deviations above 10% can be sustained.67
The exact function of the 10% rule is at the heart of the issue in 
Cox. Many courts have expressly recognized the rule as a safe harbor 
within which a state redistricting plan cannot be challenged absent 
invidious discrimination.68 Other courts have treated the rule as an 
evidentiary rule that merely assigns the burden of proof: below 10%, 
the plaintiff must prove invidious discrimination; above 10%, the 
state must show a valid state justification.69
  First, the plaintiff must show deviation sufficient to make out a prima facie 
case. Deviations below ten percent ordinarily will be considered de minimis. 
However, legislators should not be tempted by the “de minimis” rule to aim for a 
ten percent deviation, because their obligation is to make “an honest and good faith 
effort to construct districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” Were 
a state to set “ten percent deviation” as a goal, this in and of itself may provide 
sufficient additional evidence of invidious discrimination to constitute a prima facie 
case of unconstitutionality.  
Katharine Inglis Butler, Redistricting in a Post-Shaw Era: A Small Treatise Accompanied by 
Districting Guidelines for Legislators, Litigants, and Courts, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 137, 154 
(2002) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 64. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 748−49. 
 65. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577 (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that a State 
make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as 
nearly of equal population as is practicable.”). Reynolds involved Alabama senatorial districts 
that were disproportionate by factors of as much as forty to one. Id. at 545. House districts 
varied by as much as sixteen to one. Id. The Alabama State Legislature had not reapportioned 
itself in over sixty years. Id. at 539−40. 
 66. See Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 745. 
 67. Id. at 749. The Court found such a legitimate interest in Voinovich v. Quilter where 
it upheld a state legislative districting plan with deviations above 10% because the state could 
have been reasonably advancing a state policy of preserving county boundaries. 507 U.S. 146, 
161−62 (1993). Likewise, in Brown v. Thomson, the Court upheld a 60% deviation in 
Wyoming state legislative districts because of state constitutional and historical interests. 462 
U.S. at 843. 
 68. See supra note 60.
 69. See, e.g., Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1220 (4th Cir. 1996) (“In other words, for 
deviations below 10%, the state is entitled to a presumption that the apportionment plan was 
the result of an ‘honest and good faith effort to construct districts . . . as nearly of equal 
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2. Gerrymandering claims 
Unlike “one person, one vote” claims, gerrymandering claims, 
whether racially or politically motivated, deal with the discriminatory 
effects of irregularly drawn district boundaries, generally without 
emphasis on population deviations.70
Claims of racial gerrymandering must prove that race factors 
predominate in the drawing of district lines and that the redistricting 
legislation has negative effects on a particular racial class.71 Likewise, 
in partisan gerrymandering claims, plaintiffs must prove both 
intentional discrimination against a political group and an actual 
discriminatory effect resulting from the district lines.72 Racial 
gerrymandering was not at issue in Cox v. Larios, and while the 
partisan gerrymandering claim was dismissed by the district court, 
the rationale employed by the three-judge panel and by the 
concurrence on appeal to the Supreme Court implicates principles 
relating to partisan gerrymandering. 
Prior to Davis v. Bandemer, partisan gerrymandering was 
thought to be a nonjusticiable political question.73 And while the 
facts of Davis were insufficient to sustain a claim of partisan 
gerrymandering, the Court did recognize that legislatures could go 
too far.74 However, in the recent case of Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court 
revisited Davis v. Bandemer and, in a plurality opinion, found that 
partisan gerrymandering claims are not justiciable.75
population as is practicable.’ However, this is a rebuttable presumption.” (citation omitted)); 
Cecere v. County of Nassau, 274 F. Supp. 2d 308, 311 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Given that the 
deviation rate is under 10%, the plan is presumptively constitutional.”); Hulme v. Madison 
County, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1047 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (“[A] total population deviation of less 
than 10% enjoys a presumption of validity and will not, by itself, support a claim of invidious 
discrimination.”). 
 70. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (Fortas, J., concurring). 
 71. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 644 (1993). 
 72. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986). 
 73. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Hidalgo County Water Improvement Dist. No. 2, 424 U.S. 950 
(1976) (affirming the decision of a three-judge District Court that determined that political 
gerrymandering equal protection challenges to a state legislative plan were nonjusticiable); 
Ferrell v. Hall, 406 U.S. 939 (1972) ; Wells v. Rockefeller, 398 U.S. 901 (1970); WMCA, 
Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4 (1965). But see, e.g., Davis, 478 U.S. at 120 (dismissing for want 
of a substantial federal question but inferring justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims); 
Kelly v. Bumpers, 413 U.S. 901 (1973); Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S. 808 (1972).
 74. See Davis, 478 U.S. at 119. 
 75. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1778 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“[Since Davis 
v. Bandemer,] no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political 
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III. COX V. LARIOS  
While this Note focuses on the implications of Cox v. Larios76 as 
a case where the Supreme Court wrongly affirmed the lower court, 
the totality of the Court’s opinion amounts to only four words: “The 
judgment is affirmed.”77 The case was heard on direct appeal and 
summarily affirmed.78 Yet, unlike a denial of certiorari review, 
summary dispositions bind lower courts with the reasoning of the 
three-judge district court.79 Therefore, the implications of the 
summary affirmance in Cox, as espoused in Justice Stevens’s 
concurrence and in the reasoning of the district court, upset 
precedent and create significant issues for state legislatures across the 
nation. Thus, this discussion spends considerable time analyzing the 
logic arising in both Justice Stevens’s concurrence and in the 
judgment of the three-judge district court. 
A. Factual Background 
The case arrived at the district court after the Georgia General 
Assembly enacted both state legislative and congressional 
reapportionment.80 plans, beginning in 2001.81 The 2000 U.S. 
Census revealed that Georgia’s total population increased enough to 
give them the right to two additional congressional seats pursuant to 
2 U.S.C. § 2a.82 Additionally, the census showed that the urban and 
gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that political 
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that Bandemer  was wrongly decided.”). 
 76. 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004). Hereinafter, Cox refers to the affirming decision of the 
Supreme Court affirmation, which is the principal case of this Note. Larios will be used to 
denote the prior district court ruling, Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (2004), in the same 
case. 
 77. Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2806. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Lunding v. N.Y. Tax App. Trib., 522 U.S. 287, 307 (1998) (stating that while 
the Supreme Court may give less precedential value to its own summary dispositions, the lower 
courts are nevertheless bound); U.S. v. Blaine County, Montana, 363 F.3d 897, 904 (9th Cir. 
2004) (stating that it is a “well-established rule that the Supreme Court’s summary affirmances 
bind lower courts, unless subsequent developments suggest otherwise” (citing Hicks v. 
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344−45 (1975))). 
 80. See Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1323. Because the Georgia General Assembly oversaw 
both redistricting and reapportionment efforts, the terms are used interchangeably to describe 
the factual history of the case. 
 81. Id. In Georgia, the General Assembly is required to engage in redistricting and 
reapportionment following each U.S. decennial census. See GEORGIA CONST. art. III, § 2, ¶ 2. 
 82. See Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1323. 
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suburban areas of north Georgia grew at a much faster rate than the 
population of rural, southern Georgia, leading to the redistricting of 
state legislative districts as well.83
After a lengthy and politically charged process—encompassing a 
gubernatorial veto, two special legislative sessions, and a series of 
lawsuits—the Georgia General Assembly eventually adopted separate 
state House and Senate legislative redistricting plans.84 In accord 
with the requirements of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,85 
Georgia filed for declaratory judgment in the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a declaration that the 
plans enacted in the special sessions “did not have the purpose or 
would not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote 
on account of race or color.”86 Ultimately, the plans in question were 
absolved of any allegations of racial discrimination and were 
precleared.87
Meanwhile, members of the Republican Party who were 
adversely affected by the plans, including several incumbent 
legislators, filed suit in the federal District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia, alleging that both the congressional and the 
 83. Id. 
 84. In two special sessions, the General Assembly enacted bills apportioning the state 
senate (“the 2001 Senate Plan”) and state house of representatives (the “House Plan”), and 
Governor Roy Barnes subsequently signed both bills. Id. at 1323–24. 
  Congressional redistricting in Georgia is a collaborative effort between the 
state House of Representatives and the state Senate. The House and Senate each 
passed a redistricting plan, both of which were referred to a conference committee 
composed of six members, three each from the House and Senate. There were no 
Republican representatives on the conference committee. On the final day of the 
special session, the conference committee sent a compromise redistricting plan back 
to the House and Senate. Each chamber passed the plan, and it was signed by the 
governor. 
Id. at 1335. 
 85. Georgia is one of the specified jurisdictions required to receive preclearance from the 
federal government upon any change to its election laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). 
 86. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1324. 
 87. A three-judge panel precleared the congressional and house plans but refused to 
preclear the 2001 Senate Plan. Id. Eventually, the section 5 issues with the 2001 Senate Plan 
were resolved in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), vacating 195 F. Supp. 2d 25 
(D.D.C. 2002). Uncertain of the fate of the 2001 Senate Plan, however, the General Assembly 
adopted a revised senate plan (“the 2002 Senate Plan”) that, although not substantially 
different from the 2001 Senate Plan, was precleared by a federal district court. Georgia v. 
Ashcroft, 204 F. Supp. 2d 4, 15−16 (D.D.C. 2002). 
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state legislative districting plans were unconstitutional.88 While only 
the state legislative redistricting plan was at issue on appeal, a brief 
summary of the district court’s rationale in upholding the 
congressional plan helps put this Note in context. 
1. The congressional plan 
In harmony with the strict standard applied to congressional 
reapportionment, the three-judge district court reviewed Georgia’s 
2001 Congressional Plan,89 which had a total population deviation of 
only seventy-two people, or 0.01% of the “ideal congressional 
district.”90 After most of the plaintiff’s claims were either dismissed 
or decided on summary judgment in favor of the state, the district 
court was left only to consider whether the population deviation 
violated the “one person, one vote” principle. 91 To determine this, 
the court considered two questions: (1) whether deviations could be 
reduced by good faith effort, and (2) whether the deviations could 
be justified.92
 88. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1321−22. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2000), a 
three-judge court was convened, including one circuit court judge and two district court 
judges. Id. at 1322. 
 89. While the congressional plan is not the focus of the controversy in the principal case, 
this Note briefly reviews the facts and reasoning of the district court for the purpose of framing 
inconsistencies in the state legislative districting decision. The court invalidated the state 
legislative plans because of a process enveloped in partisan influence. Yet the court found the 
congressional plan to meet the higher constitutional standards uniquely applicable to 
congressional apportionment, even though the plan was the result of the same process and 
involved similar, if not more significant political influence. Thus, the fact that the district court 
upheld the congressional plan but invalidated the state plan shows an element of inconsistency. 
See discussion infra Part III.A.1.  
 90. The court noted that the average district’s absolute deviation was only seventeen 
people, or 0.003%. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1335. 
 91. The Plaintiffs challenged the congressional plan on the basis that it violated Article I, 
Section 2 of the Constitution, the “one person, one vote” principle, and that it violated the 
Equal Protection Clause based on partisan and racial gerrymandering. Id. at 1322. The 
Plaintiffs also alleged that the state violated the First Amendment, 2 U.S.C. § 2c, and the 
Equal Protection Clause by using a combination of single- and multi-member districts in the 
State House of Representatives. All of these claims were either dismissed or decided in favor of 
the state on summary judgment. Id.; see also Larios v. Perdue, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. 
Ga. 2003) (dismissing claims brought pursuant to 2 U.S.C.S. § 2c, which challenge the 
combination of single- and multi-member districts). The court also granted summary 
judgment in favor of the state on the claims of partisan gerrymandering. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 
2d at 1322. 
 92. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1354. 
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Because there was testimony that a plan could have been drawn 
with a deviation of plus or minus one person, which split fewer 
counties, was more compact, and divided fewer voting precincts,93 
the court determined that a “good faith” effort had not been 
made.94 Additionally, the court found that the congressional districts 
were the obvious result of political influences, revealing “a process 
dominated by the personal interests of individual legislators and not 
by the traditionally recognized redistricting criteria.”95 Highlighting 
this principle, the court found that of the thirteen congressional 
districts created under the plan, four of eight existing Republican 
representatives were paired against each other while no Democrat 
was paired against another.96
However, in asking whether the deviations could be justified, the 
court discounted the partisan influence, stating that “[p]olitics and 
political considerations are . . . ‘inseparable from districting and 
apportionment’” and that “a redistricting process need not be free of 
politics in order to be constitutional.”97 Thus, to find the state’s 
justification for the deviations, the court turned to the testimony of 
the principal reapportionment committee staff member who testified 
that given the reality of political constraints, a zero population 
deviation became impossible without “splitting more precincts or 
further splitting existing split precincts along something other than 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. Despite spending considerable time describing how a better plan could have 
been crafted, the court concluded that “it is immaterial that a ‘better’ plan might have been 
possible.” See id. at 1334−37, 1353−56. 
 95. Id. at 1355 (referencing a specific legislator’s desire to create districts that would 
lead to successful congressional campaigns for his son). One state senator admitted that passing 
a districting plan is an “extraordinarily political process because so many legislators have 
aspirations of being elected to Congress and . . . have an interest in crafting a district they 
consider politically desirable.” Id. at 1336 (restating the testimony of Senator Eric Johnson, a 
Republican). One of the most oddly shaped Congressional districts, touching parts of eleven 
counties, resulted from various Senators attempting to create districts that would be 
“advantageous in the event they attempted to launch their own congressional careers.” Id. 
Another district was drawn across the middle of the state. This decision was influenced by one 
legislative leader who wanted to create a more challenging district for a sitting congressman. 
Id. (revealing the former speaker of the house’s intent to make Congressman Barr’s reelection 
“more challenging”). In fact, testimony was offered that political considerations played a 
significant role in the shape of one district simply because “each vote in the Senate would be of 
critical importance” in passing the compromise bill, thus “the drafters could not afford to 
alienate any one senator.” Id. 
 96. Id. at 1356. 
 97. Id. at 1354 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973)). 
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an easily recognizable boundary.”98 Therefore, on the remaining 
“one person, one vote” claim, the district court upheld the 
congressional districting plan, reasoning that the population 
deviation was small,99 the state had an interest in avoiding further 
precinct splits,100 and the deviations did not result in any partisan 
advantage.101
2. State legislative plans 
Yet while the district court ultimately discounted political 
influence in its determination that the congressional redistricting 
plan withstood constitutional scrutiny, the court found that the state 
legislative redistricting plans—which resulted from the very same 
process and were shaped by similar, if not exactly the same, partisan 
influences102—went too far.103 In essence, even though the district 
deviations were below 10%, the court reasoned that because the 
deviations were apparently the result of undue political influence, 
they amounted to a violation of the “one person, one vote” 
principle. 
One of the many guidelines that the Georgia General Assembly 
adopted required that each House and Senate district be within 5% 
of the ideal district so that the total deviation did not exceed 10%.104 
Bipartisan committees were formed in both the House and Senate,105 
which ultimately adopted separate plans, each with a total deviation 
of 9.98%.106 According to the legislative staff working with the 
committees, because the plans would ultimately need a coalition of 
 98. Id. “[H]aving precinct lines correspond with major natural or man-made boundaries 
made it easier for election officials who are responsible for maintaining an accurate list of 
voters” and made it easier for “voters to determine what district they are in.” Id. at 1336. 
 99. Id. at 1356 (the showing required to justify population deviations is proportional to 
the size of the deviations). 
 100. Id. at 1354−55. 
 101. Id. at 1356. 
 102. See id. at 1323. 
 103. See id. at 1322, 1338. 
 104. Id. at 1323. 
 105. The House committee consisted of twenty-nine House members, eighteen 
Democrats and eleven Republicans. Id. at 1325. The Senate committee consisted of twenty-
four senators, twenty Democrats and four Republicans. Id. at 1327. Separate Democrat and 
Republican subcommittees were formed to draft competing plans. Id. at 1325−26. 
 106. See id. at 1326−27. 
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votes to pass, the political desires of many of the individual members 
were taken into account in setting district boundaries.107
Consequently, because Democrats were in the majority and 
largely represented urban and rural districts,108 the court concluded 
that many of the senior incumbents sought to preserve their own 
political influence and that of their constituent districts by drawing 
the most favorable districts possible.109 The result was that a number 
of “Democrat-leaning” rural and urban districts were 
underpopulated while “Republican-leaning” suburban districts were 
often overpopulated.110 Also, the House Plan paired forty-two 
incumbents in the same districts for reelection, including thirty-seven 
Republicans and nine Democrats. In the Senate, ten incumbent 
Republicans were drawn into districts pairing them against other 
incumbents, compared with only two incumbent Democrats.111 
Despite the seeming advantages afforded to Democrats, the 2002 
election, carried out under the plans, resulted in no measurable 
adverse impact on Republicans.112
3. District court findings and conclusions of law 
As previously mentioned, among the plaintiff’s several claims,113 
only the claim that the state plans violated the “one person, one 
vote” principle of the Fourteenth Amendment survived dismissal or 
 107. Id. at 1326 (“[I]ncumbents in all areas of the state sought to limit the expansion of 
their districts to what was considered legally necessary, i.e., a population deviation of ± 5%.”). 
 108. See id.  
 109. See id. 
 110. Id. Overpopulated districts tend to indicate a lessening in the weight of votes cast 
within the district, while underpopulated districts indicate the opposite. Exactly one-half of all 
house districts had a deviation of plus or minus 4.0%, with some as high as plus or minus 4.9%. 
Id. The House Plan also split eighty counties into 266 parts. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1327. 
 112. For example, under the plan, the 2002 election resulted in Republicans gaining two 
senate seats, and ultimately control of the Senate. Before the enactment of the plan, Democrats 
had only thirty-two senate seats and Republicans held twenty-four. With the election, 
Republicans gained two additional seats, but following the election, four Democrats switched 
allegiance to the Republican party, giving Republicans majority control of the state Senate. Id. 
at 1327. While one could argue that Republicans might have gained greater influence had 
districts been drawn more favorably, such an outcome is pure speculation based on 
assumptions of voter preferences. The actual impact of the legislative plans had no actual 
negative impact on Republicans nor did they diminish the preexisting Republican influence in 
the state legislature. 
 113. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the First Amendment, as well as partisan and 
racial gerrymandering. See supra note 91. 
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summary judgment.114 There were no viable claims of racial 
discrimination, and the claim of unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymandering was decided in favor of the State on summary 
judgment.115
Yet, in deciding the state legislative “one person, one vote” 
claim, the court essentially combined the facts underlying the failed 
partisan gerrymandering claim with the purportedly partisan-
motivated population deviation, which was below 10%, to invalidate 
the plans.116 Citing Karcher, a congressional apportionment case, the 
court reasoned that “deviations from exact population equality may 
be allowed in some instances in order to further legitimate state 
interests . . . .”117 However, it indicated that “where population 
deviations are not supported by such legitimate interests but, rather, 
are tainted by arbitrariness or discrimination, they cannot withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.”118 In the court’s view, attempts by 
legislators to protect Democratic incumbents and minimize the 
degradation of rural and inner-city legislative influence were 
invidious.119
The state contended that previous Supreme Court decisions on 
state legislative districting had created a 10% safe harbor, within 
which states need not provide any justification absent invidious, 
racial discrimination.120 The court rejected this argument, framing 
the “so-called ‘ten percent rule’” as a means for allocating the 
burden of proof.121 That is, if the plaintiff can show a deviation above 
10%, the burden falls on the defendant-state to show adequate 
justification.122 But even if the plaintiff fails to show such a deviation, 
 114. See Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1322. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1330 n.7. The court indicated that the facts offered to support partisan 
gerrymandering, while failing to support a claim, showed “intent to use population deviations 
to further advance the same goals.” Id. 
 117. Id. at 1337 (citing Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.725, 740−41 (1983)). 
 118. Id. at 1338 (citing Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) (dealing with a state 
legislative apportionment case with excessive population deviations, such that population-per-
senator and population-per-representative disparities ranged from 1,643 to 64,820)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1340. 
 121. Id. at 1339 (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973) (“[M]inor 
deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insufficient to make 
out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to 
require justification by the State.”)). 
 122. Id. at 1340 (citing Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983)). 
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it can nevertheless provide other evidence to meet its burden of 
proof.123 The court found evidence that the 9.98% deviation was 
intended to advance inappropriate regional and partisan motivations 
sufficient to establish a violation of the “one person, one vote” 
principle.124 The court then sought state justification by reviewing 
whether any “traditional districting criteria” were the basis of the 
deviations.125
 
a. Evidence of regional interests. The court found evidence that a 
substantial portion of the 9.98% population deviation was the result 
of “a deliberate and systematic policy of favoring rural and inner-city 
interest at the expense of suburban areas [around] Atlanta . . . .”126 
Relying on Reynolds v. Sims, the court noted that where significantly 
greater voting power is given to citizens in one region of the state, 
the “one person, one vote” principle is clearly violated.127 The court 
did recite dicta from another case indicating, however, that “regional 
considerations in drawing of district lines were likely permissible so 
long as they did not result in substantial vote dilution.”128 Despite 
the purported regional interests that were allegedly designed to give 
rural, southern Georgia greater voting power, southern Georgia 
 123. “[T]he 10% threshold ‘does not completely insulate a state’s districting plan from 
attack of any type’ but rather ‘serves as the determining point for allocating the burden of 
proof in a “one person, one vote” case.’” Id. (quoting Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1220 (4th 
Cir. 1996)). 
 124. Id. at 1327, 1341–42, 1348. 
 125. Id. at 1341–42. 
 126. Id. at 1327. Emphasizing statements about not wanting to “lose any more 
representation out of rural south Georgia than they had to,” the court determined that state 
legislators were primarily motivated by regional interests that resulted in the deviations. Id. at 
1342. The court reasoned that the deviations were “an unambiguous attempt to hold onto as 
much of that political power as they could . . . aided by what they perceived to be a 10% safe 
harbor.” Id. at 1328. 
 127. Id. at 1342−43 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567−68 (1964)). The court 
cited a series of cases in which districting plans with a regional bias were invalidated Id. at 
1344−45 (citing Marshall v. Hare, 378 U.S. 561, aff’g 227 F. Supp. 989 (D. Mich. 1964) 
(deviation of 2 to 1); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (deviation of 2.65 to 1); WMCA, 
Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (deviation of 1.5 to 1)). 
 128. Id. at 1345 (citing Marylanders for Fair Representation v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 
1022, 1035 (D. Md. 1994)). 
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actually lost seven seats in the House and two seats in the Senate due 
to the redistricting plan.129
 
b. Evidence of incumbent protection. The court found further 
evidence of invidious discrimination in Democratic efforts to protect 
incumbents because they created an unfair bias against 
Republicans.130 Rather than focusing on the net result of the 
elections, in which Republicans actually gained seats in both houses, 
the court instead focused on the fact that more incumbent 
Republicans were paired with other incumbents than were 
Democrats; the court concluded that that the plans represented an 
intentional effort to allow incumbent Democrats to maintain or 
increase their delegation,131 while making reelection more difficult 
for certain, targeted Republican incumbents.132 Because this was 
purportedly achieved by “vastly” overpopulating the Republican 
districts by as much as 4.97%,133 this imbalance formed another basis 
for invalidation.134
 129. Id. It is possible that rural areas might have lost more seats had districts been drawn 
more favorably for suburban areas, and this is ostensibly why the court found the regional 
motivations to violate the “one person, one vote” principle. See id at 1347. 
 130. Id. at 1330. The court seems to discount evidence that Republicans actually gained 
seats in both the House and the Senate, inferring that the primary focus was not on the net 
result of partisan success, but rather on the effect on incumbents. 
 131. Id. Thirty-seven Republicans and nine Democrats were paired with incumbents in 
the House, with the result that only twenty-eight of the thirty-six paired incumbents 
(Republican and Democrat) could be reelected. Id. at 1328. Similarly, in the Senate, there 
were four pairings pitting Republican incumbents against each other and two that pitted 
incumbent Republicans against incumbent Democrats. Id. at 1329–30. The court noted, as 
further evidence of supposed impropriety, that one Republican senator was drawn into a 
district with a Democrat incumbent while an open district was drawn within two blocks of her 
residence. Id. at 1330. Additionally, two of the most senior Republican senators were drawn 
into the same district, and one Republican representative was drawn into the same district as a 
Democrat incumbent, presumably because the Republican was “generally disliked.” Id. 
 132. Id. (“Democratic incumbents attempted to draw districts that would enhance their 
own prospects at re-election and further their other political ends . . . but also that they 
targeted particular Republicans to prevent their re-election.”). The court went on to state that 
because the redistricting process was applied in a “blatantly partisan and discriminatory 
manner,” the plans “destroyed the re-election hopes of dozens of incumbents.” Id. at 1347. In 
fact, a total of eighteen Republican incumbents in the House and four in the Senate who were 
so paired actually lost their 2002 reelection bid while only three Democrats (all from the 
House) were ousted in the same way. Id. at 1329−30. 
 133. Id. at 1348. The author quotes the word “vastly” because he believes it to be a 
gross mischaracterization and overstatement of a less than 5% deviation. 
 134. Id. 
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c. Examining traditional districting criteria as a justification. 
Having determined that the plaintiff did provide sufficient evidence 
of invidious discrimination, the court next examined whether the 
population deviations in the state legislative redistricting plans might 
have been the result of the state’s interest in employing “[t]raditional 
[r]edistricting [c]riteria.”135 The court reviewed the types of policies 
that “might permit some deviation from perfect population 
equality.”136 Among the criteria mentioned, the court identified 
“making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, 
preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between 
incumbent Representatives.”137
The court found that the State did not try to defend the 9.98% 
deviation on the basis of any traditional criteria.138 But as with the 
congressional plan, the court conceded that the preservation of 
precinct lines may have been a marginal concern in the state 
legislative plans, but unlike the congressional plan, the court 
invalidated Georgia’s House and Senate Plans, finding that the 
preservation of precinct lines was insufficient to explain the state 
legislative plan’s deviation.139
B. The Direct Appeal: Summarily Affirmed 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253,140 the State of Georgia appealed 
the invalidation of the state legislative redistricting plans directly to 
the Supreme Court.141 The Court issued a four-word opinion,142 
summarily affirming the decision of the three-judge district court,143 
 135. Id. at 1331. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. (quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 40 (1983)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1333 n.9. 
 140. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2004) reads: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court 
from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or 
permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of 
Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges. 
Id. 
 141. See Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004). 
 142. Id. (“The judgment is affirmed.”). 
 143. See SUP. CT. R. 18.12 (providing for the summary disposal of cases brought on 
direct appeal; if not disposed of summarily, the appeal is set for full briefing and argument). 
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with Justice Stevens filing a concurring opinion in which Justice 
Breyer joined.144 Justice Scalia filed a dissent.145
1. Stevens’s concurrence 
Justice Stevens characterized Cox as an affirmation that Georgia’s 
legislative reapportionment plans violated the “one person, one 
vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause.146 He supported the 
district court’s conclusion that Georgia’s plan was invalid, both 
because improper regional interests influenced the district 
populations147 and because the deviations showed evidence of an 
intentional effort to maintain or increase the power of incumbent 
Democrats.148
After a brief review of selected findings of the district court on 
the partisan impact of the Georgia plans, Justice Stevens focused on 
the impact of the plans on incumbent legislators.149 He reviewed the 
scenarios played in the district court, discussing the manner in which 
district lines were drawn to force Republican incumbents to run 
against each other or against Democrat incumbents. 150 He also 
agreed with the district court that the overpopulation of Republican-
leaning districts led to “significant overall partisan advantage for 
Democrats . . . .”151
Justice Stevens also emphasized the absence of any state 
proffered justification for the deviations, mentioning a litany of 
“traditional districting criteria,” specifically, compactness, contiguity, 
keeping counties whole, and preserving the cores of prior districts.152 
He then reasserted the district court’s conclusion that the deviations 
were intended to benefit Democrats by maintaining and/or 
 144. Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2806 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 145. Id. at 2809. 
 146. Id. at 2806. 
 147. Id. (citing Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2004)). 
 148. Id. (citing Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1329). 
 149. Id. at 2807 (“[Democrat drafters] intended not only to aid Democratic incumbents 
in getting re-elected but also to oust many of their Republican incumbent counterparts.”). 
 150. Id. Justice Stevens highlighted the plight of one Republican who was pitted against 
an incumbent Democrat simply because she was “generally disliked.” Id. 
 151. Id. (quoting Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1331). 
 152. Id. 
8DAL-FIN 12/16/2004 1:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
2024 
 
increasing their influence through “the impairment of the 
Republican incumbents’ reelection prospects.”153
Justice Stevens further rejected the argument that a “safe harbor” 
existed for population deviations of less than 10% because such a rule 
would weaken the “one person, one vote standard.”154 Citing Vieth 
v. Jubelirer,155 which declared partisan gerrymandering claims to be 
nonjusticiable, he cautioned that “the equal-population principle 
remains the only clear limitation on improper districting practices, 
and we must be careful not to dilute its strength.”156 Despite the fact 
that the claim of partisan gerrymandering had been dismissed at trial, 
Justice Stevens seems to confuse the plaintiff’s “one person, one 
vote” claim as one of partisan gerrymandering: “Drawing district 
lines that have no neutral justification in order to place two 
incumbents of the opposite party in the same district is probative of 
[partisan gerrymandering].”157
Expressing apparent dissatisfaction for the plurality opinion in 
Vieth, Justice Stevens concluded by stating that the “unavailability of 
judicially manageable standards cannot justify a refusal to condemn 
even the most blatant violation of a state legislature’s fundamental 
duty to govern impartially.”158
 153. Id. (quoting Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1334). 
 154. Id. at 2808 (“[A]ppellant invites us to weaken the one-person, one-vote standard by 
creating a safe harbor for population deviations of less than ten percent, within which 
districting decisions could be made for any reason whatsoever. The Court properly rejects that 
invitation.”). 
 155. 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004). 
 156. Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2808. 
 157. Id. Justice Stevens seemed to further justify his support of the partisan 
gerrymandering claim by explaining that, in the 2002 election, state Republican senatorial 
candidates won a majority of votes statewide (991,108 votes to 814,641 for Democrats). Id. 
Yet, Justice Stevens clearly notes that the partisan gerrymandering claim was dismissed, was not 
appealed, and was not before the court. Id. Perplexingly, Justice Stevens stated, “[H]ad the 
Court in Vieth adopted a standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims, the 
standard likely would have been satisfied in this case.” Id. 
 158. Id. at 2809 (quoting Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1813 (internal quotations marks 
omitted)). Apparently referencing Vieth, Justice Stevens also stated, “I remain convinced that 
in time the present ‘failure of judicial will,’ will be replaced by stern condemnation of partisan 
gerrymandering that does not even pretend to be justified by neutral principles.” Id. (citations 
omitted). 
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2. Scalia’s dissent 
In his dissent, Justice Scalia framed the issue in terms of giving 
deference to states in the redistricting of their own legislative 
boundaries.159 While Justice Stevens rejected the notion that 
precedent provided a 10% “safe harbor,”160 Justice Scalia recognized 
the established principle that “minor deviations” among state 
legislative districts—that is, de minimis deviations below 10%—do 
not require justification by the states because they are “insufficient to 
make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”161
Justice Scalia highlighted what is arguably the critical issue: 
“whether a districting plan that satisfies this 10% criterion may 
nevertheless be invalidated on the basis of circumstantial evidence of 
partisan political motivation.”162 He reminded the Court that this 
issue was brought on appeal and not on a petition for writ of 
certiorari; thus the case should “not [be] summarily affirm[ed] unless 
it is clear that the disposition . . . is correct.”163 He concluded that 
the district court’s decision was not clearly correct because a strong 
case existed that Georgia’s plan complied with constitutional 
requirements.164
First, he noted that the only claim on appeal was an alleged 
“impermissible political bias” that resulted from population 
deviations that were not easily justified by “traditional” redistricting 
criteria.165 The plaintiff made no viable contention that the 
deviations, all smaller than 5% from the mean, were based on “race 
or some other suspect classification.”166
Even if the de minimis population deviations in the Georgia plan 
required justification, the flaw in the analysis of the concurring 
opinion, according to Justice Scalia, was that it assumed that 
 159. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 160. See supra note 154 and accompanying text .  
 161. Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2809 (citations omitted); Voinovich v Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 
160−62 (1993)); see also Hasen, supra note 13 (stating that many read prior Supreme Court 
cases as creating a 10% safe harbor and that the summary affirmance in Cox “seems to reverse 
that thinking”). 
 162. Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2809 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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“politics as usual” was not a traditional criterion of redistricting.167 
He cited Vieth, in which “all but one of the Justices agreed that 
[‘politics as usual’] is a traditional criterion, and a constitutional one, 
so long as it does not go too far.”168 He added his belief that “[i]t is 
not obvious . . . that a legislature goes too far when it stays within 
the 10% disparity in population our cases allow.”169 As a 
consequence, Justice Scalia foreshadowed that this destruction of the 
10% safe harbor elaborated in previous decisions would invite a flurry 
of politically motivated lawsuits based on “allegations of political 
motivation whenever there is population disparity . . . .”170 While not 
arguing to summarily reverse, Justice Scalia proposed setting the case 
for argument.171
IV. ANALYSIS: TAKING THE POLITICS OUT OF POLITICS 
The Supreme Court’s summary affirmation of Larios represents a 
precarious departure from precedent that will open the door to 
judicial dominion of the state legislative process with regards to state 
legislative redistricting. 
First, the Court erred in using evidence of partisan influence in 
the failed partisan gerrymandering claim to substantiate a purported 
violation of the “one person, one vote” principle—essentially 
creating a new cause of action. In doing this, the Court, at least by 
implication, rejects the 10% safe harbor rule for states crafting their 
own legislative districts and misapplies the congressional standard to 
state legislative districts. Even if the 10% rule were not a safe harbor 
but was instead a rule for allocating the burden of proof, evidence of 
unfair political bias is not prima facie evidence of invidious 
discrimination requiring state justification of some traditional state 
interest—that is, strict scrutiny does not apply because incumbent 
politicians are not a protected class. Another flaw in the reasoning of 
Cox is that political influence is improper in the redistricting process; 
politics is an inherent part of the legislative process. Finally, in 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004)). 
 169. Id. at 2809−10. 
 170. Id. at 2810. He also stated, “Ferreting out political motives in minute population 
deviations seems to me more likely to encourage politically motivated litigation than to 
vindicate political rights.” Id. 
 171. Id. Pursuant to Court Rules, cases brought on direct appeal can be disposed of 
summarily, or can be set for full briefing and oral argument. SUP. CT. R. 18.12. 
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rejecting the 10% safe harbor and proscribing political influence, the 
Court invites an increase in redistricting litigation that will cost states 
millions of dollars and infringe on states’ ability to exercise their 
legislative discretion in redistricting. 
A. The Court’s Erroneous Equal Protection Arithmetic 
The Court ultimately erred by attempting to dress up the failed 
partisan gerrymandering claim—dismissed at the district court—as a 
violation of the “one person, one vote” principal of equal 
protection.172 Simply put, a failed gerrymandering claim plus a failed 
“one person, one vote” claim should not equal a successful equal 
protection claim—that is nothing more than flawed legal math.173
Partisan gerrymandering and “one person, one vote” claims are 
distinct creatures. A gerrymandering theory relates exclusively to the 
effect of drawing district boundaries in a discriminatory way.174 In 
contrast, a “one person, one vote” theory is directly related to the 
weight of an individual vote resulting from the population or 
demographics of a district.175 Confusing the two and framing the 
claim in this way gave new life to the Georgia Republicans’ cause. 
The Court essentially endorsed a new cause of action where two 
failed claims can be combined to create a novel successful claim.176
While Justice Stevens’s desire to issue a “stern condemnation of 
partisan gerrymandering”177 may be noble, in light of Vieth’s holding 
that “political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable,”178 Justice 
Stevens is likely wrong. In affirming the district court, the Supreme 
Court found a violation of the “one person, one vote” principle but 
 172. See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1330 n.7 (N.D. Ga. 2994) (“While the 
plaintiffs’ partisan gerrymandering claim has been dismissed, the evidence presented by the 
plaintiffs regarding an intent to gerrymander districts . . . indicates an intent to use population 
deviations to further advance the same goals.”). 
 173. See Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants at *7–8, Cox (No. 03-1413), available at 
2004 WL 882937 (“Strangely, a plaintiff could successfully combine two otherwise insufficient 
claims—a de minimis deviation claim and a failed political discrimination claim—so that the 
sum of those insufficient claims somehow adds up to a winning claim. That should not be the 
law.”). 
 174. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 175. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 176. See Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants, Cox (No. 03-1413), available at 2004 
WL 882937. 
 177. Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2806 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 178. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1770, 1778 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
8DAL-FIN 12/16/2004 1:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
2028 
 
based its decision on evidence of partisan gerrymandering. A strong 
argument can be made that a “one person, one vote” claim that is 
based on the same operative facts and elements as a nonjusticiable 
gerrymandering claim is, in fact, the same claim and would likewise 
be nonjusticiable. 
B. In “One Person, One Vote” Claims, Population Deviations  
Below 10% in State Legislative Districts Are De Minimis and  
Should Not Require Justification by the States 
Both the district court and the concurrence on appeal err in 
rejecting the 10% safe harbor rule for state districting. Clearly, on 
claims involving alleged violations of the “one person, one vote” 
principle, the Supreme Court has recognized a threshold under 
which minor deviations in state legislative districts require no 
justification.179 Georgia’s redistricting plan, while close, falls within 
the 10% safe harbor, requiring no justification in an equal protection 
claim based on minor district population deviations. Yet, the district 
court circumvents this rule by framing it as an evidentiary rule, 
merely creating a rebuttable presumption of constitutionality. This 
result amounts to a misunderstanding of the asserted claims. It also 
ignores the importance of the deference that prior Courts have given 
to states sovereignty. 
1. Federalism and “one person, one vote”: a basis for deference 
First, states should be given greater latitude and afforded 
deference in drawing state legislative districts, especially when there 
is no evidence of discrimination against a protected class. 
Reapportionment and redistricting primarily fall within a state 
legislature’s “sphere of competence.”180 And while equal protection 
principles govern a state’s drawing of legislative districts,181 
“[f]ederal-court review of districting legislation represents a serious 
intrusion on the most vital of local functions.”182 Thus, states should 
 179. See supra note 58.  
 180. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001). 
 181. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).  
 182. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995). 
8DAL-FIN 12/16/2004 1:30 PM 
1999] The Implications of Cox v. Larios 
 2029 
 
be given deference in questions of state districting,183 and courts 
should play a more passive role, asserting themselves only when there 
is obvious invidious discrimination.184
2. De minimis deviations need no justification 
There is tension between the amount of deference states should 
be afforded and the specific requirements of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Yet, the rule that has emerged to balance these important 
interests—the 10% rule—is both fair and workable. It is well 
established that “minor deviations” among state legislative districts 
require no justification by the state.185 This deference affords states 
“broader latitude” in drawing their own legislative districts than 
when drawing congressional districts186 but still requires “‘substantial 
equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote of 
any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other 
citizen in the State.’”187
In White v. Regester,188 the Supreme Court determined that the 
lower court erred when it ruled that a population differential of 9.9% 
from the ideal district, in the absence of special justification, 
constituted a prima facie equal protection violation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.189 Furthermore, the Court expressly refuted 
the notion that minor deviations must be justified to “avoid 
 183. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578 (noting that state legislative districting is different in 
kind from congressional districting; a more flexible standard for state district population 
deviations is constitutionally acceptable). 
 184. See generally Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court: Gerrymandering, 
“Fair Representation,” and an Exegesis Into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 527, 
532 (2003) (arguing that the Court should play a passive role and take a minimalist judicial 
approach to both racial and political gerrymandering questions). 
 185. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 160 (1993); Brown v. Thomson, 462 
U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (quoting Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973)). 
 186. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973) (“[B]roader latitude has been afforded 
the States . . . in state legislative redistricting . . . .”). 
 187. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 744 (emphasis added) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S at 579). 
The Court has also determined that “[a]n unrealistic overemphasis on raw population figures, 
a mere nose count in the districts, may submerge [legitimate state] considerations and itself 
furnish a ready tool for ignoring factors that in day-to-day operation are important to an 
acceptable representation and apportionment arrangement.” Id. at 749. 
 188. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973). 
 189. Id. at 763. The Court rejected the contention that the tolerances afforded state 
districting were diluted by cases subsequent to Gaffney. Id. (“Kirkpatrick v. Preisler did not 
dilute the tolerances contemplated by Reynolds v. Sims with respect to state districting . . . .”). 
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invalidation under the Equal Protection Clause.”190 The Court 
reasoned that “relatively minor population deviations among state 
legislative districts [do not] substantially dilute the weight of 
individual votes in the larger districts so as to deprive individuals in 
these districts of fair and effective representation.”191
Later, the Court expressly recognized the “under-10%” rule in 
Connor v. Finch.192 In addressing population deviations of 16.5% and 
19.3% in the Mississippi State Senate and House, respectively, the 
Court stated that such deviations “substantially exceed the ‘under-
10%’ deviations the Court has previously considered to be of prima 
facie constitutional validity only in the context of legislatively enacted 
apportionments.”193 While there has not been absolute agreement,194 
a significant number of subsequent cases have affirmed the 10% rule 
as a safe harbor under which a state plan will be upheld.195
 190. Id. at 763−64 (“[W]e did not hold [that] any deviations from absolute equality, 
however small, must be justified to the satisfaction of the judiciary to avoid invalidation under 
the Equal Protection Clause.” (referring to Mahan, 410 U.S. at 327; Swann v. Adams, 385 
U.S. 440 (1967); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967))). 
 191. Id. at 764. While upholding the 9.9% deviation, the Court warned, “[v]ery likely, 
larger differences between districts would not be tolerable without justification ‘based on 
legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.’” Id. (quoting 
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579). 
 192. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977) (affirming the de minimis approach 
in state legislative districting). But see Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969) 
(rejecting the de minimis approach in the context of congressional districting). 
 193. Connor, 431 U.S. at 418. 
 194. For cases that are read to not recognize the 10% rule as a safe harbor, see Daly v. 
Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1220 (4th Cir. 1996) (interpreting the 10% rule as creating only a 
“rebuttable presumption” that an apportionment plan is the result of “‘an honest and good 
faith effort to construct districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is practicable’”); Cecere v. 
County of Nassau, 274 F. Supp. 2d 308, 311 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Given that the deviation rate 
is under 10%, the plan is presumptively constitutional.”); Hulme v. Madison County, 188 F. 
Supp. 2d 1041, 1047 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (“[D]eviation of less than 10% enjoys a presumption of 
validity and will not, by itself, support a claim of invidious discrimination.”); Marylanders for 
Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1032 (D. Md. 1994) (“[P]lan with 
maximum deviation below ten percent could still be successfully challenged, with appropriate 
proof . . . .”); Story v. Anderson, 611 P.2d 764, 767 (Wash. 1980) (allowing only minor 
deviations when necessary to achieve “legitimate, rational state objectives”). 
 195. See, e.g., Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502, 522 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[B]elow a 
certain threshold the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case and the districting body 
will not be required to justify minor variations. The court has indicated that this threshold is 
ten percent.” (citation omitted)); In re Constitutionality of House Joint Resolution 1987, 817 
So. 2d 819, 827 (Fla. 2002) (finding that deviations for state House and Senate districts “fall 
well under the 10% deviation that the Supreme Court and this Court have recognized as 
constitutionally valid”); Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646, 656 (Md. 1993) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has unequivocally built a 10% degree of flexibility into the one person, 
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3. The 10% rule is both a safe harbor and a means of allocating  
the burden of proof 
Georgia’s total deviation of 9.98% is mathematically below the 
10% threshold. Yet, the district court and, by implication of the 
summary affirmance, the Supreme Court attempt to paint the 10% 
rule, not as a safe harbor, but as merely a threshold for a rebuttable 
presumption of constitutionality.196 This section argues that the 10% 
rule is both a means of allocating the burden of proof and a safe 
harbor. 
As previously noted, many cases stand for the proposition that 
states are shielded from scrutiny if state districting plans contain 
deviations smaller than 10%.197 However, as other courts have found, 
falling within the safety of the 10% rule merely establishes a 
rebuttable presumption of constitutionality.198 To support this latter 
proposition, the district court cited Daly v. Hunt.199
In Daly, the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the district court 
was required to consider total population or merely voting-age 
population in calculating district deviations.200 In its discussion, the 
court noted that “for deviations below 10%, the state is entitled to a 
presumption that the apportionment plan was the result of an 
‘honest and good faith effort to construct districts . . . as nearly of 
equal population as is practicable.’ . . . However, this is a rebuttable 
presumption.”201
one vote requirement so that states can accommodate important concerns in reapportioning 
their legislatures.”); Black Political Task Force v. Connolly, 679 F. Supp. 109, 123 (D. Mass. 
1988) (holding that city and state electoral districts “fall within the de minimis ten percent 
deviation rule that insulates state redistricting plans from effective challenge as violative of the 
‘one person one vote’ precept”); Gorin v. Karpan, 775 F. Supp. 1430, 1437 (D. Wyo. 1991) 
(“[T]he Court has provided only one definitive benchmark—the ten percent de minimis rule. 
Under this rule, a state need not justify ‘minor’ population inequalities . . . .”).  
 196. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1339−40 (2004). 
 197. See supra note 195. 
 198. See supra note 194. 
 199. 93 F.3d 1212 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1220 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964)). It should be 
noted that at least one scholar has warned that if a state intends to enact deviations of 10%, it 
could be possible to prove that a good faith effort was not made to reach population equality. 
See Butler, supra note 63. In such a setting, it is argued that there may be sufficient evidence of 
bad faith and invidious discrimination to “constitute a prima facie case of unconstitutionality.” 
Id. Yet, the guidelines adopted by the Georgia General Assembly did not purport to aim for a 
total 10% deviation, but rather established that the plans were to be within the plus or minus 
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If it were binding on this case, Daly might seem conclusive. 
Arguably, Daly represents good law; however, the district court 
misapplied the Daly principle in the present case. The confusion in 
Cox seems to arise from a failure to distinguish between the legal 
theories at issue. The Daly court went on to say, “Presumably, an 
apportionment plan that satisfies the 10% de minimis threshold could 
nevertheless be challenged under another theory, such as a violation 
of the Voting Rights Act or as an unconstitutional racial 
gerrymander.”202 In other words, the 10% safe harbor only insulates 
states from claims of violations of the “one person, one vote” 
principle but does not insulate a state plan from attacks on other 
grounds. 
Thus, whether the 10% rule provides a safe harbor or merely a 
rebuttable presumption of constitutionality depends on the nature of 
the claim. A deviation below 10% precludes a “one person, one vote” 
claim—that is, a claim of a violation of equal protection based on 
disparate district populations—because it cannot be said that 
anyone’s vote had been “substantially diluted.”203 However, with 
regards to some other legal theory such as racial gerrymandering or a 
violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, a de minimis 
deviation represents only a rebuttable presumption of 
constitutionality.204
Vera v. Bush helps illustrate this distinction.205 While the case 
deals specifically with congressional districts, it presents a logical 
analysis that is applicable in an analogous state legislative districting 
5% limits allowed under federal law. See Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1322, 1338; supra note 104 
and accompanying text. While there was evidence that Democrat legislators hoped to achieve a 
partisan advantage, see supra note 95, there was no direct evidence presented that a 10% 
deviation was the goal of the Legislature; rather, the deviation was likely the result of the 
myriad factors, including, inter alia, political, regional, and personal motivations. As the 
district court also indicated, one of the possible factors, although not a substantial one, was a 
desire not to further divide precincts. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 202. Id. at 1220–21. 
 203. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 746 (1973) (“[I]t makes little sense to 
conclude from relatively minor ‘census population’ variations among legislative districts that 
any person’s vote is being substantially diluted.”). 
 204. See Daly, 93 F.3d at 1221. 
 205. 933 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 n.9 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (implementing a court ordered plan 
with a greater deviation than the original legislative proposal because of unconstitutional racial 
gerrymandering; the original plan adopted in 1991 had a zero population deviation while the 
court ordered plan resulted in a 0.82% deviation from the ideal district); see also HEBERT ET 
AL., supra note 36, at 1. 
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context. In 1991, the State of Texas prepared a congressional 
districting plan with a 0% population deviation among its districts, 
exactly meeting constitutional requirements of “one person, one 
vote.”206 Had there been some deviation, the higher congressional 
standard would require the state to show justification. However, 
with a 0% deviation, a claim challenging its constitutionality solely on 
the basis of “one person, one vote” would fail because some deviation 
is required to substantiate a claim. Nevertheless, while a “one person, 
one vote” challenge would not succeed, its constitutionality is 
rebuttable in the sense that it may still be vulnerable to other claims. 
In Vera, the federal district court invalidated the Texas plan, not 
because it violated the “one person, one vote” principle but because 
there was substantial evidence that the shape of the districts resulted 
in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering.207
In the state context, the same logic applies. When a state exceeds 
the allowable deviation of 10%, it must clearly justify the deviation.208 
When it falls below the threshold, it should be within the safe harbor 
for “one person, one vote” claims and should not be required to 
show justification.209 However, while the population deviation may 
no longer be an issue, that fact provides only a presumption of 
constitutionality—rebuttable only if there are other constitutional 
claims or legal theories supported by prima facie evidence. 
Georgia’s population deviations were mathematically smaller 
than 10%, and therefore its plan is presumptively constitutional in 
accord with the district court holding. However, this 10% threshold 
also provides a safe harbor on claims alleging a violation of the “one 
person, one vote” principle based on population disparity: only 
deviations above 10% provide prima facie evidence of violations of 
the “one person, one vote” principle. While its constitutionality 
could have been called into question on some other legal theory, the 
evidence was insufficient to support a claim of partisan 
gerrymandering, and no claims survived involving racial 
discrimination under section 2 or section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act,210 the Equal Protection Clause, or Article I, Section 2 of the 
 206. Vera, 933 F. Supp. at 1348. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 845−46 (1983). 
 209. See, e.g., id. at 842. 
 210. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). 
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U.S. Constitution.211 Consequently, the plaintiff failed to overcome 
the constitutional presumption, and Georgia’s districting plans 
should have been upheld without requiring any explanation. 
Furthermore, by ignoring the 10% threshold, the Court also 
improperly obliterated the distinction between congressional and 
state legislative redistricting. As previously discussed, states must 
justify any deviation in populations only among congressional 
districts.212 Since state legislative districts were first required to satisfy 
“one person, one vote” guarantees in Reynolds v. Sims,213 state 
legislatures have not been required to be mathematically perfect and 
have not been required to justify minor population deviations among 
state legislative districts.214 In attempting to require states to justify 
such deviations in the present case, the district court improperly 
relied on the rationale of congressional districting cases in which the 
higher standard is applied.215
It could be argued that a 9.98% deviation is not materially 
different from a deviation that is slightly greater than 10%—in this 
regard, the distinction is little more than arbitrary. This raises the 
question of the value of having a brightline rule. If states are to be 
sufficiently guided, so as to be able to successfully enact redistricting 
plans and avoid unnecessary litigation, a brightline rule is critical. 
Brightline rules allow legislatures to both understand and comply 
with the law, promoting uniformity and predictability.216 Just as 
important, brightline rules help to “clearly allocat[e] responsibilities 
among competing decisionmakers,” giving their decisions more 
legitimacy.217 The 10% rule, as advanced in this Note, serves this 
purpose well. For better or worse, the rule has emerged, at least in 
perception, as being a firm 10%.218 How this number was derived is 
 211. Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806, 2809 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 212. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 213. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 214. See supra note 60 (listing cases that did not require states to justify deviations below 
10%). 
 215. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (citing Karcher v. 
Daggett 462 U.S. 725, 740−41 (1983)); see also discussion supra Part III.A.3. 
 216. See Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Bush v. Gore: Form and the Law of 
Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 74–75 (2002) (describing the benefits and 
disadvantages of brightline rules and flexible standards). 
 217. See id. 
 218. See CLARKE & REAGAN, supra note 4, at 50. As one publication on state legislative 
redistricting litigation, published by the Federal Judicial Center, indicates: 
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not readily explainable and may, in fact, be completely arbitrary. 
However, even if the Court were to decide that the 10% rule should 
really be a 9.98% rule, clarity is critical. If the Court truly sought to 
disavow itself of any brightline rule to apply the stricter congressional 
standard to state legislative redistricting, the issue should have been 
fully briefed and argued—the states should not be left guessing in 
the aftermath of a summary affirmance. 
C. Georgia Need Not Justify Its State Districting Plans Because 
Incumbent Politicians Are Not a Protected Class 
Another reason to reject the result in Cox, which was not 
addressed by the district court, is that it hinges on the applicability of 
strict scrutiny. Neither the district court nor the Supreme Court 
indicated the application of strict scrutiny review, but by implication, 
this Note contends that the outcome of Cox necessarily but 
improperly implicated such a review. Specifically, the Georgia state 
legislative redistricting statute was neutral on its face, did not have 
the purpose or the effect of discriminating against a constitutionally 
protected class, and did not involve population deviations of 
sufficient size to make a prima facie case of a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Thus, invalidating the redistricting statute 
because the state did not justify the deviations with some substantial 
state interest is nothing more than the misapplication of strict 
scrutiny review. 
Generally, states are insulated from strict scrutiny by courts on 
state legislative redistricting plans unless there is evidence of 
invidious discrimination against a constitutionally protected class.219 
After deciding that “relatively minor” population deviations from mathematical 
equality among state legislative districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie 
case, White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 
735, 745 (1973), the Court established a benchmark for determining whether a 
legislature’s redistricting plan violates the one person–one vote principle in Brown v. 
Thompson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983): “an apportionment plan with a maximum 
population deviation under 10% falls within [the] category of minor deviations. A 
plan with larger disparities in population, however, creates a prima facie case of 
discrimination and therefore must be justified by the State.” Id. at 842–43 (citations 
omitted). Thus, if the maximum deviation is greater than 10%, the state must justify 
the population disparity by showing a rational and legitimate state policy for the 
districting plan. 
Id. 
 219. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 
900, 916 (1995). 
8DAL-FIN 12/16/2004 1:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2004 
2036 
 
Principally, evidence of racial discrimination will subject a 
redistricting plan to strict scrutiny,220 but a prima facie case of 
invidious discrimination can also be made by showing a total 
population deviation exceeding 10%.221 However, in cases such as 
Cox, where no racial discrimination is at issue and where deviations 
exceeding 10% do not exist, the state need not show any compelling 
or traditional state interest. 
1. Strict scrutiny for suspect classifications 
Any laws that classify citizens on the basis of race, including 
districting schemes, are constitutionally suspect and subject to strict 
scrutiny.222 Thus, if racial classifications in districting plans were 
explicit, “[no] inquiry into legislative purpose [would be] 
necessary.”223 Yet, “[d]istricting legislation ordinarily, if not always, 
classifies tracts of land, precincts, or census blocks, and is race neutral 
on its face.”224 Consequently, a districting law warrants strict scrutiny 
only if one can prove that the law was “‘motivated by a racial 
purpose or object,’”225 or if the law is “unexplainable on grounds 
other than race.”226
Furthermore, strict scrutiny only applies “if race was the 
‘predominant factor’ motivating the legislature’s districting decision” 
or “‘the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting 
principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and 
respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual 
shared interests, to racial considerations.’”227 In other words, strict 
scrutiny only applies when “the legislature subordinate[s] traditional 
race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial considerations.”228
 220. Miller, 515 U.S. at 904−05. 
 221. See Brown, 462 U.S. at 842−43. 
 222. See Hunt, 526 U.S. at 546. 
 223. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993). 
 224. Hunt, 526 U.S. at 547. 
 225. Miller, 515 U.S. at 913 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 644). 
 226. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 644 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)); see also Miller, 515 U.S. at 913. 
 227. Hunt, 526 U.S. at 547 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916). 
 228. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916; see also CLARKE & REAGAN, supra note 24, at 10. 
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2. Purely partisan objectives, absent other evidence of invidious 
discrimination, do not invoke strict scrutiny 
Districting primarily motivated by a desire for partisan advantage 
is not subject to strict scrutiny even if the redistricting is “performed 
with consciousness of race.”229 But, as Justice Scalia noted, there is 
no colorable contention that the population deviations in Georgia 
were based on race.230 The only evidence of “invidious 
discrimination” cited by Justice Stevens or the District Court was the 
partisan manipulation of district boundaries and populations for 
partisan, personal, and regional advantage.231 In particular, both the 
district court and Justice Stevens seemed to focus on the unfair bias 
against incumbents. However, even if the effect of the state 
redistricting plan was to discriminate against certain incumbents, it 
does not follow that states should have to show some compelling 
traditional interest to justify the plans because incumbent politicians 
are not likely to be deemed a constitutionally protected class. 
D. “Politics as Usual” Is a Traditional Districting Criterion 
The district court’s opinion and Justice Stevens’s concurring 
opinion seem to improperly classify the extent of Georgia 
Democrats’ political influence as a form of invidious 
discrimination.232 The inference is that because there was evidence of 
political influence, there was sufficient evidence of discrimination to 
require justification of the deviations in Georgia’s plans.233 Yet, as 
 229. See Hunt, 526 U.S. at 551; Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996). 
 230. Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806, 2809 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 231. See id. at 2806−07 (Stevens, J., concurring); Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1329–34. 
One court noted, “a [state] may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so 
happens that the most loyal Democrats happen to be black Democrats and even if the State 
were conscious of that fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526, U.S. 541, 551 (1999). Thus, absent 
discriminatory racial effects, political gerrymandering is not subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 
551−52; see also Vera, 517 U.S. at 968; id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 232. Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2809 (Stevens, J., concurring)  
 [T]he unavailability of judicially manageable standards cannot justify a refusal ‘to 
condemn even the most blatant violation of a state legislature’s fundamental duty to 
govern impartially.’ I remain convinced that in time the present ‘failure of judicial 
will,’ will be replaced by stern condemnation of partisan gerrymandering that does 
not even pretend to be justified by neutral principles.  
Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1813 (2004). 
 233. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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Justice Scalia noted, this inference assumes that “‘politics as usual’ is 
not itself a ‘traditional’ districting criteria.”234
Ultimately, the question of “traditional” districting principles is 
not entirely settled. 235 Even those cases making reference to them fall 
short of giving any real explanation as to their source or validity.236 
However, as Justice Scalia implies, the issue of “traditional” 
redistricting criteria may be a determinative factor in redistricting 
and reapportionment cases.237 If a state has relied on these criteria, 
even a constitutionally suspect redistricting plan may survive scrutiny. 
Some traditional principles discussed by the Court include 
compactness, population equality, contiguity, respect for political 
subdivisions, natural geographic boundaries, regularity, maintaining 
district cores, and other traditional elements.238 However, because 
the application of traditional districting criteria is not constitutionally 
 234. Id. at 2809 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 235. See HEBERT ET AL., supra note 36, at 59; see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 
(1993) (indicating that traditional districting criteria are “objective factors that may serve to 
defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines”). Professor Altman has 
argued that 
Five of the least contested redistricting objectives are . . . 
1) Population equality: this criterion is satisfied when there is no substantial 
deviation in population between districts; 
2) Contiguity: a district is contiguous if it is possible to reach every point in the 
district from another point without crossing the district boundary; 
3) Compactness: a district is compact if its shape is geometrically regular; 
4) Creating fair electoral contests: there are many characteristics that could be 
attributed to “a fair contest.” The most common ones include maximal 
competitiveness, neutrality, and a constant swing ratio for each party; and 
5) Representational goals: these goals seek to insure that all social sects have a 
political voice in an election; examples include the protection of communities of 
interest and non-dilution of minority representation. 
Altman, supra note 38, at 99−100; cf. Hunt, 526 U.S. at 545 (discussing how the district 
court found evidence of discrimination where “‘[t]he legislature disregarded traditional 
districting criteria’”) (quoting Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants at 21a–22a, Hunt v. 
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (No. 4:96-CV-104-BO(3)), available at 1998 WL 
34080897).
 236. See infra note 238. 
 237. See Cox, 124 S. Ct. at 2809. 
 238. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 84 (1997) (revealing the traditional districting 
principles of maintaining “district cores, four traditional ‘corner districts’ in the corners of the 
State, political subdivisions such as counties and cities, and an urban majority-black district”); 
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) (recognizing natural geographic boundaries, 
regularity, contiguity, compactness, and conformity to political subdivisions); Shaw, 509 U.S. 
at 639, 646 (recognizing compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions as 
traditional districting principles); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168 (1977) 
(recognizing sound districting principles such as compactness and population equality). 
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required239 and may vary from state to state, there exists no 
comprehensive list.240 Furthermore, while these principles might be 
considered “traditional,” historically, there were very few, if any, laws 
truly governing districting.241 Thus, it is both plausible and likely that 
politics is just as valid and traditional as any other “traditional” 
districting criteria, so long as it does not go too far. 
Yet in Cox, the Court incorrectly determines that political and 
regional interests are improper motivations in state legislative 
redistricting. The reality is that legislatures consider more than 
compactness, contiguity, and municipal boundaries when setting 
district lines. Equally important are perhaps less obvious criteria 
inherent in the legislative process: any legislative deliberation, 
especially in the context of redistricting, will almost always include a 
measure of concern for local or regional interests, political 
expediency, legislative compromise, and even arbitrariness (such as 
personal opinion or instinct).242 These factors are the essence of the 
legislative prerogative.243 So long as the legislative power, “wholly 
 239. See, e.g., Vera, 517 U.S. at 962 (holding that the Constitution does not mandate 
regularity of district shape). At least one scholar has noted that the constitutional mandate of 
population equality is at odds with the state interests of compactness and contiguity. See Micah 
Altman, Traditional Districting Principles: Judicial Myths vs. Reality, 22:2 SOC. SCI. HIST. 
159, 188 (1998) (noting that districting “plans have become less compact since the Court’s 
requirements of equal population in districts”). Ironically, the very effort to equalize 
populations for the purpose of Equal Protection often inherently leads to oddly shaped 
districts, which in turn, could be used as evidence of racial or partisan gerrymandering. 
 240. Historically, many state constitutions provided that legislative representation was 
based upon other nonpopulation principles, such as the representation of counties, cities, or 
other geographical and political units. See MCKAY, supra note 17, 275−475. One districting 
criterion that dates back to the founding of the nation partially apportioned the Massachusetts 
and New Hampshire state legislatures according to the taxes paid in each district. Id. at 343, 
370, 466, 468. 
 241. See Altman, supra note 239, at 167. 
 242. See Russo v. Vacin, 528 F.2d 27, 30 (7th Cir. 1976) (“[C]ourts have repeatedly 
recognized that as long as legislative bodies draw electoral district lines, the political impact of 
their work will not be ignored by such bodies.”); see also MCKAY, supra note 17, at 51−54. 
 243. For example, in the districting context, when a legislator is confronted with a 
seemingly arbitrary decision, such as which side of a city block to draw a boundary line, all else 
being equal, what criteria does a legislator use? Perhaps the legislator is interested in making 
sure that certain families or friends with whom he is familiar remain grouped together. Perhaps 
his constituents have expressed concerns that might persuade him one way or the other. 
Among myriad possible criteria, the author posits that if an incumbent has the opportunity to 
draw a political rival into a different district with the stroke of a pen, without creating a wide 
disparity in population among the districts, human nature and political self-interest might sway 
the pen to one side. Does this decision become arbitrary and invidious because one of a pair of 
political rivals is adversely affected? Probably not. See, e.g., Christian Sci. Reading Room v. City 
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within the domain of state interest,” is not used to circumvent a 
federally protected right, “it is insulated from federal judicial 
review.”244 And it is unlikely that an incumbent legislator has any 
federally protected right to an easy reelection campaign. 
In weighing the political factors of districting with the 
constitutional requirements of apportionment, legislators are forced 
to strike a balance. Presumably, if legislators had no interests in 
redistricting and reapportionment, there would rarely be any 
litigated conflicts.245 Instead of the various social and political factors 
that might influence a legislator, pure statistics would dominate, 
leading to “ideal,” or statistically perfect, districts every time.246 The 
reality, however, is that redistricting and reapportionment plans are 
very contentious. 
Legislators must consider the interests of the local constituencies 
they were elected to represent,247 the goals of the political party with 
which they are allied,248 the best interests of the state, the 
constitutional aims of equal protection, and their very own political 
of S.F., 807 F.2d 1466, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (Norris, J., dissenting from rejection of a 
rehearing en banc) (discussing the nature of the legislative process as one that requires 
compromise); Cuevas v. Royal D’Iberville Hotel, 498 So. 2d 346, 359 (Miss. 1986) 
(“Compromises are reached. Votes are traded; you vote for my bill and I’ll vote for yours.” 
(discussing how vote pairing and compromise are a normal part of the legislative process)); see 
also Margaret Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 815, 872 
(2000) (“The legislative process can bring together affected interests in formulating 
compromises on contentious issues. Compromise is at the heart of the legislative process and it 
produces approaches that warrant respect by the courts.”); Marc J. Randazza, The Other 
Election Controversy of Y2K: Core First Amendment Values and High-Tech Political Coalitions, 
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 143, 233 (2004) (“Many judges and scholars agree that the very nature of 
the legislative process requires compromise . . . .”). 
 244. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960); see also W. Union Tel. Co. v. 
Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 (1918) (“Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to 
accomplish an unlawful end, and a constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to 
attain an unconstitutional result.” (citation omitted)). 
 245. Cf. MCKAY, supra note 17, at 52 (“[T]o the affected legislators [reapportionment] 
involves no less an issue than political survival.”). 
 246. See generally HEBERT ET AL., supra note 36, at 6. The “ideal” district is found by 
dividing the total state population by the total number of districts. The goal of a neutral 
apportionment plan is to create districts that exactly match the “ideal,” resulting in a zero total 
deviation. See id. 
 247. See MCKAY, supra note 17, at 52 (“The manner in which reapportionment 
questions are resolved is important to political parties, to interest groups, to the integrity of the 
governmental process, and to the people generally.”). 
 248. See id. at 53 (“Party politics is obviously a factor in determining the form any 
particular apportionment will take . . . .”). 
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survival. In many cases, the most significant factor may arguably be 
the simple political reality of the need for legislative compromise.249 
The final result is very unlikely to mirror the mathematical concept 
of the ideal district, but such perfection is not expected—at least not 
in the context of state legislative districts.250
This concept was reinforced in Vieth where, as Justice Scalia 
noted, “all but one of the Justices agreed that [politics as usual] is a 
traditional criterion, and a constitutional one, so long as it does not 
go too far.”251 Even where there is strong evidence of partisan 
influence, it can scarcely be argued that the Democrat effort in 
Georgia went too far when it had virtually no effect on the political 
landscape—under the districting plans at issue, Democrats actually 
lost seven Democratic-leaning districts in the House and two in the 
Senate.252 And while Republicans lost two of seventy-four seats held 
in the House, they actually gained two seats in the Senate, eventually 
assuming majority control.253 It could be argued, however, that 
Republicans might have increased even more in power had more 
favorable districts been drawn. However, it is unlikely that anyone 
can truly predict the outcome of a districting plan that seemingly 
favors one party.254
Even in those situations where a districting plan clearly favors 
one party, it cannot be said that it is necessarily unconstitutional.255 
Consider what the Court announced in Davis v. Bandemer: 
 249. See, e.g., id. at 53−54 (discussing examples when legislators “joined forces” with 
competing factions to achieve common purposes: to affect population distribution). 
 250. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (“We realize that it is a practical 
impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of 
residents, or citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable 
constitutional requirement.” (citing Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931)). 
“We must remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed 
a little play in its joints.” Bain, 282 U.S. at 501. 
 251. See Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806, 2809 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 1781−82 (2004)). 
 252. See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 (2004). 
 253. Id. at 1326−27. 
 254. See Redwine, supra note 23, at 396−97 (“This is because party registration does not 
win elections, votes do.” (discussing the difficulty of predicting electoral outcomes on the basis 
of partisan voter registration)); see also, e.g., Larry Peterson, Georgia Democrats Scramble To 
Capture 12th District Seat, AUGUSTA CHRON., May 14, 2004, at B06 (describing how a little-
known Republican beat out an incumbent Democrat in 2002 in a congressional district that 
was drawn heavily to favor Democrats). 
 255. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131−32 (1986). 
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[T]he mere fact that a particular apportionment scheme makes it 
more difficult for a particular group in a particular district to elect 
the representatives of its choice does not render that scheme 
constitutionally infirm. This conviction, in turn, stems from a 
perception that the power to influence the political process is not 
limited to winning elections. . . . Thus, a group’s electoral power is 
not unconstitutionally diminished by the simple fact of an 
apportionment scheme that makes winning elections more difficult, 
and a failure of proportional representation alone does not 
constitute impermissible discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause.256
 Ultimately, districting decisions are political decisions and, 
except in the most egregious situations,257 fall exclusively within the 
“legislature’s sphere of competence.”258 As one court noted, “While 
the courts should continue to try to protect voters from the misuse 
of electoral machinery, we do not propose to supplant legislative 
judgment where the only alleged misconduct is considering political 
factors in the districting process.”259
E. Regionalism Is Not Invidious so Long as It Does Not Go Too Far 
Like politics, regional interests can and do play a role in 
legislative decisions.260 While regionalism may be an impermissible 
basis to justify discrimination—such as a population deviation greater 
than 10%261—that does not mean that regional interests cannot be a 
legitimate factor, so long as they do not give one region of a state 
“vastly greater voting power than citizens in [other regions].”262 
Despite the usage of the word “vastly” in both the district court 
decision and Justice Stevens’s concurrence, it is an overstatement to 
suggest that a 5% deviation from the ideal district size gives a 
particular district “vastly greater voting power.”263
 256. Id. 
 257. See generally Russo v. Vacin, 528 F.2d 27, 30 (7th Cir. 1976) (“This is not to say 
that circumstances could not be conceived where the actions of an elected body would be so 
egregious as to constitute a breach of public trust.”). 
 258. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001). 
 259. Russo, 528 F.2d at 30. 
 260. See MCKAY, supra note 17, and text accompanying note 17. 
 261. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565−66 (1964) (holding that regionalism is an 
impermissible basis for population deviations). 
 262. See id. at 568−69. 
 263. As the State of Georgia argued in its Jurisdictional Statement to the Court: 
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Furthermore, to the extent that regional interests played any role 
in the development of the Georgia plans, it could be just as easily 
stated that it was not a regional but political bias. It was conceded at 
trial and is stated in the district court’s opinion that “rural and inner-
city areas of the state” are “Democratic-leaning” while suburban 
areas tended to be “Republican-leaning.”264 Clearly, to the extent 
that regionalism motivated Georgia Democrats’ decision-making, it 
was undoubtedly secondary to, and derivative of, their partisan 
objectives.265
F. Rejecting the 10% Rule and Proscribing Political Influence Could 
Result in Increased and Costly Litigation and Increased Judicial 
Infringement on State Sovereignty 
As Justice Scalia aptly stated, to say that a legislature goes too far 
when it stays within the 10% disparity in population “is to invite 
allegations of political motivation whenever there is population 
disparity.”266 If the 10% rule is not recognized, anytime one party 
concocts an unsuccessful alternative plan that has even slightly less 
deviation, or divides fewer counties, or achieves any number of 
other, more desirable districting attributes, there will undoubtedly 
  The strained effort of the district court to square its rulings with the decisions 
of this Court is apparent from its untenable characterization of the deviations in this 
case. Remarkably, the district court characterized Georgia’s slightly positive 
deviation districts as “vastly more overpopulated” than the slightly negative districts 
(J.S. 18a), notwithstanding the fact that all of the deviations are less than +-5% and 
all are “minor” as a matter of law under this Court’s decisions. Labeling Georgia’s 
deviations “vast” when they are not, cannot render unconstitutional what falls 
within the parameters of this Court’s previous decisions. 
See Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants at *23–24, Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806 (2004) 
(No. 03-1413), available at 2004 WL 882937. As this Note discusses, the Court’s prior 
decisions paint total deviations below 10% as de minimis. It defies logic that a deviation can be 
both “vast” and de minimis at the same time. Rather, vastly greater voting power would result 
only where there are substantial deviations among districts. See, e.g., John B. Manning, Jr., 
Comment, Constitutional Law—The Equal Protection Clause in District Reapportionment: 
Representational Equality Versus Voting Equality—Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 
763 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991), 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1243, 1249 & 
n.40 (1991) (describing a situation in which one district had twice as much voting power as 
another as “vastly greater voting power”). 
 264. See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2004). 
 265. See, e.g., id. at 1327 (listing the five primary goals of the Senate Reapportionment 
Committee chairman and listing partisan objectives ahead of regional objectives). 
 266. Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806, 2810 (2004). 
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be claims of partisan influence.267 Technology makes zero population 
deviation possible, but as the Supreme Court noted in Gaffney, just 
because “closer to zero deviation plans [are] possible” does not 
mean that the judiciary should review the propriety of such minor 
deviations.268 In fact, the court stated: 
Involvements like this must end at some point, but that point 
constantly recedes if those who litigate need only produce a plan 
that is marginally “better” when measured against a rigid and 
unyielding population-equality standard. . . . 
 The point is, that such involvements should never begin. We 
have repeatedly recognized that state reapportionment is the task of 
local legislatures or of those organs of state government selected to 
perform it. Their work should not be invalidated under the Equal 
Protection Clause when only minor population variations among 
districts are proved.269
Even in the present case, Republicans provided their proposed 
redistricting plans, boasting lower deviations and fewer divided 
counties and precincts, as evidence of the undue Democratic 
influence.270 The reality is that there will be claims of undue 
influence anytime one political party realizes an advantage over 
another by virtue of redistricting legislation. Thus, removing a safe 
harbor threshold opens the door to an increase in politically 
motivated litigation. 
Furthermore, according to the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, following the 2000 census, twenty-nine of forty-seven 
states surveyed had population deviations above 9% in at least one, 
and usually both, houses of their state legislatures.271 Because of the 
obvious implication, there could be substantial challenges to the 
constitutionality of the state districting plans in the majority of states 
based on charges of improper political, or even regional bias. Not 
 267. See Rhonda Cook, Justices OK New Districts; Court-Drawn Maps Favorable to GOP 
in Place for Primary, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 1, 2004, at 1A (stating that “political observers 
agreed with legal experts that [the Cox decision] might invite more redistricting lawsuits”). 
 268. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 740 (1973). 
 269. Id. at 750−51. 
 270. See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1328 n.3 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (describing 
Republican plans with deviations far below the Democrats’ 9.98% deviation). 
 271. See Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants, Cox (No. 03-1413), available at 2004 
WL 882937; see also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 12. 
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only could such actions inhibit state legislative prerogatives, but they 
will most assuredly cost the states millions of dollars in increased 
legal fees.272
Piercing the 10% rule also takes a first step towards complete 
judicial usurpation of state sovereignty over the districting process. 
The facts of the present case show that within the context of 
legislative process, politics is inherent. While the Court apparently 
did not recognize “politics as usual” as an acceptable and traditional 
districting criterion, as the dissent did, it clearly has an impact. In any 
legislative body, legislators debate, negotiate, and compromise to 
reach agreement and ultimately pass legislation, including districting 
plans.273 Consequently, state legislatures need “wiggle room” to be 
able to reach political compromise. The trial court noted that “[a] 
legislature is not free to put forth an unconstitutional map, asserting 
that it did the best it could given the political constraints imposed by 
its members.”274 Of course, whether a legislature achieves a 
constitutional districting proposal depends, in large part, on the 
standard it must meet. Without the somewhat flexible standard of 
the 10% safe harbor, legislators may lose the ability to reach an 
effective compromise. In fact, in some circumstances it is possible 
that legislators may never agree on something as contentious as a 
redistricting plan. As the Supreme Court noted in Karcher v. 
Daggett: 
[E]xperience proves that cases in which a federal court is called 
upon to invalidate an existing apportionment, and sometimes to 
substitute a court-ordered plan in its stead, frequently arise not 
because a newly enacted apportionment plan fails to meet the 
[constitutional criteria], but because partisan politics frustrate the 
efforts of a state legislature to enact a new plan . . . .”275
 272. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 20 (describing the cost of attorney fees relating to Cox v. 
Larios and related cases). 
 273. See, e.g., Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1326 (noting that incumbents had to 
compromise on a district proposal to ensure that the needed ninety-one votes were secured to 
ensure the plan’s passage); see also id. at 1336 (noting that “each vote in the Senate would be 
of critical importance, [so] the drafters could not afford to alienate any one senator by 
disregarding his or her personal desires”). 
 274. See id. at 1354 (citing Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 533 (1969)).
 275. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734 (1983) (citing Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. 
Supp. 68 (D. Colo. 1982)); see also Shayer v. Kirkpatrick, 541 F. Supp. 922 (W.D. Mo. 1982), 
summarily aff’d, 456 U.S. 966 (1982); O’Sullivan v. Brier, 540 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Kan. 
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If legislatures lose the ability to achieve political compromise 
influenced by partisan objectives, then legislatures may often find 
themselves unable to enact timely reapportionment plans. As a 
consequence, the federal courts will be called upon with increasing 
frequency to oversee or actually draw more and more redistricting 
plans, effectively stripping the states of this legislative function and 
grafting it onto the judicial branch. 
And if the intention is to remove politics from redistricting, 
passing the baton to the courts may not achieve the desired apolitical 
end; federal courts are not entirely free of political influences and 
would merely become the forum for partisan intentions.276 Instead of 
removing political influences, federal court domination of this 
process may only shift the situs of the debate;277 this would represent 
a serious intrusion into an inherently local and legislative function278 
that is contrary to the principles of both horizontal and vertical 
federalism. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The immediate impact of Cox v. Larios may not be readily 
apparent. Had the court summarily affirmed the case without filing 
any concurrence or dissenting opinions, the case may have gone 
unnoticed to all but those few unfortunate incumbents who failed to 
retain their elected office. Yet after every election and after every 
decennial census, the winners and losers will raise the debate and 
1982); Donnelly v. Meskill, 345 F. Supp. 962 (D. Conn. 1972); David v. Cahill, 342 F. Supp. 
463 (D. N.J. 1972); Skolnick v. State Electoral Bd. of Ill., 336 F. Supp. 839 (N.D. Ill. 1971). 
 276. See Redwine, supra note 23, at 396 (“[J]udicial commandeering of the redistricting 
function will not immunize districting from political influence; it will merely change the 
battleground. As a result, such judicial overreach will likely end only in increased politicization 
of the courts.”). 
 277. See id. at 397 (“The bottom line is that if the redistricting function is allocated to 
the courts, the courts will simply end up determining for themselves what the appropriate 
allocation of partisan seats in the legislature will be.”). 
 278. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (reapportionment falls within 
the legislature’s exclusive “sphere of competence”); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 
(1995) (“Federal-court review of districting legislation represents a serious intrusion on the 
most vital of local functions. It is well settled that ‘reapportionment is primarily the duty and 
responsibility of the state.’”) (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)). But see 
Note, A New Map: Partisan Gerrymandering as a Federalism Injury, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1196 
(2004) (arguing that partisan gerrymandering and undue political influence by state 
legislatures actually injures federalism). 
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rehash the recurring issues concerning the constitutionality of 
redistricting proposals. 
In rejecting the 10% safe harbor, the Court radically departed 
from the precedent upon which most states have relied in setting 
state legislative districts. By requiring justification for de minimis 
population deviations, the Court also erased the longstanding 
distinction between congressional and state legislative redistricting 
jurisprudence. Forcing states to meet the stricter standard in state 
legislative districting will inevitably lead to more frequent, politically 
motivated law suits, costing taxpayers more money and causing 
everyone more headaches. States should be given the flexibility they 
need, within constitutional reason, to exercise legislative discretion, 
negotiate, and make compromises. The courts should also give states 
the utmost deference, absent invidious discrimination against 
constitutionally protected classes. 
If the Court truly wanted to upset precedent and wade into the 
“forbidden political waters”279 of state party politics, it should not 
have done so by merely handing down a summary affirmation. 
Despite the naïve desire to sternly condemn partisan influences,280 
the Court cannot blindly ignore the political nature of the state 
legislative process where the effect of politics is anything but de 
minimis. Politics is, after all, a part of the political process. There will 
always be political winners and losers; some incumbents may be 
forced out of office. Does this fact, absent evidence of racial 
discrimination or substantial population inequality among districts, 
justify judicial intervention? Only if incumbent politicians have 
become a constitutionally protected class. 
James R. Dalton
 279. See Supreme Court Rules on Congressional Redistricting in Georgia, NewsMax.com, 
June 30, 2004 (quoting the attorney representing the State of Georgia), at http://www.news 
max.com/archives/articles/2004/6/30/111756.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).  
 280. See Cox v. Larios, 124 S. Ct. 2806, 2809 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
